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This project explores intergenerational transmission of trauma as evidenced in the body.  
Specifically, I focus attention on the somatic experiences of two white South African women, 
one historical/biographical and one fictional/contemporary, to elaborate the legacy of white 
colonial psychic disavowals in post-colonial South Africa.  Using feminist and relational 
psychodynamic theories, this project addresses the alexithymia of the colonial predicament via 
an assertion that unwitnessed somatic distress as a result of disavowed trauma in individuals is 
potentially transmitted to subsequent generations and requires nuanced clinical attention.  
Additionally, this project argues that interrupting the intergenerational transmission of collective 
traumas such as colonialism must involve curiosity about somatic manifestations of disavowed 
violence and aggression.   
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Something outside of us has been stored inside of us.  How did it get there? 
Stephen Mitchell, From ghosts to ancestors (1998, p.845) 
 
In my clinical work I have regularly encountered the ways in which the psychiatric 
establishment diminishes somatic complaints (often coined medically unexplained illness, 
somatic preoccupation or Somatoform disorder) in clients/patients and finds little usefulness in 
bearing witness to what the body attempts to convey—the unspeakable narratives of trauma.  
These complaints can include chronic headaches, asthma, reproductive issues, abdominal pain, 
dizziness, skin and muscle discomfort, nausea, difficulty swallowing or breathing, vomiting, skin 
rashes, seizures, and back pain.  As I will discuss in my literature review, and largely as a result 
of original theorizing by Freud on hysteria, somatic symptomology is frequently dismissed in the 
clinical encounter as “just psychosomatic,” implying some pathological fabrication or 
malingering on the part of the individual patient.   
While recent empirical and theoretical research on the connection of somatic 
symptomology to unsayable/inexpressible trauma (van der Kolk, 1994 & 2000) has made some 
advances in engaging the body as container of implicit memories of trauma, this research is 
largely focused on treatment of the individual in whose psyche and body, it is assumed, 
repressed trauma is stored.  I endorse the underlying aims of this somatically-informed 
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psychotherapy and body-work in relationship to trauma resolution.  What I seek to explore in this 
project is more insight into the problem of intergenerational trauma transmission and more 
specifically to elaborate on the possibility that one mechanism of trauma transmission occurs via 
the body.  I possess a strong curiosity (based on my clinical work) in the mechanism by which 
trauma transmission occurs intergenerationally in families and communities.  For the purposes of 
this project I seek to explore the possibility that psychosomatic symptomology is, in a way, an 
alexithymia of the colonial predicament and a mechanism by which bodies are literally haunted 
by the collective trauma of the colonial encounter. 
I argue that experiences in the body are regularly split off in the “talking cure” of analytic 
treatment (Knoblauch, 1997, p. 492).  While recent (van der Kolk, 1994 & 2000) empirical 
literature has made attempts to re-assert the necessity of attending to the body in the treatment of 
trauma, the phenomenon of psychogenic, somatic, psychosomatic and conversion symptoms in 
individuals remains marginalized. Contemporary analytic historians of somatic-based therapies 
argue that, since Freud, there has been a “biased interest in the power of the mind to affect and/or 
control body experience” (Shapiro, 1996, p. 7).  In this project, I pose the question:  What if the 
body mattered?  In other words, what if I were to trace narrative and seek out clinical material, 
via the body? Is it possible for a body to speak about its own haunting legacies? 
Through an exploration of the relevant literature on somatic preoccupations and 
application of feminist critical theory as well as an intersubjective/relational lens, my project 
explores the unknowable traumatic impact of colonialism on the bodies of two white South 
African women, one fictional/contemporary (Lucy of JM Coetzee’s novel Disgrace (1999)) and 
one real/historical (Olive Schreiner, author of The Story of an African Farm (1883)).  This thesis 
utilizes two essential theories applied to the phenomenon of the impact of intergenerational 
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transmission of trauma on the body to expand contemporary perspectives on clinical 
understandings of the etiology of somatic preoccupations as well as possible nuanced clinical 
applications.  In the process of this exploration, I engage in a method of focusing on corporeal 
textualities as a means of better understanding the complex phenomenon of the transmission of 


























This study explores the mechanism by which transgenerational transmission of trauma 
occurs via the bodies of individuals impacted by legacies of colonialism in the context of South 
Africa.  By utilizing feminist theory and relational theory I analyze, in lieu of a specific case 
study, two documents relevant to my identified phenomenon: Olive Schreiner’s published 
correspondences (Olive Schreiner Letters, 1988 (edited by Richard Rive but acknowledged to be 
imperfect and imprecise)) and J.M. Coetzee’s 1999 novel, Disgrace.  This chapter will outline 
my methodology.  The following chapter will name and elaborate on the specific phenomenon I 
used my method to evaluate and will describe some common themes identified in relationship to 
somatic symptomology in the form of a literature review. Chapter four will explore feminist 
theory and in particular will explore its relevance to contemporary psychoanalytic theory and 
literary criticism. In chapter five I will discuss relational theory, and in particular focus on both 
the relevance and limitations of an intersubjective frame in my “reading” of somatic 
symptomology in Schreiner and Coetzee’s texts.  Finally these two theories will be used to 
elucidate possible clinical implications specifically related to treating and conceptualizing the 






The uniqueness of my method 
 There is a longstanding tradition within psychoanalytic theorizing that interacts with 
cultural production such as literature and film (Emmett & Veeder, 2001). My methodology is, in 
large part, not only the organizing principle of my thesis project, but also represents a possible 
strategy for engaging with somatic symptomology.  I am interested in exploring the relationship 
between historical collective psychic trauma of colonialism/postcolonialism on the somatic 
experiences of white women colonizers in the context of South Africa.  Influenced by a curiosity 
regarding somatic manifestations of the psychic trauma of 
colonialism/postcolonialism/racism/imperialism, I seek to elucidate the clinical implications of a 
psychoanalytic and historicist exploration of traces (ghosts/phantoms) of the legacy of 
colonialism/postcolonialist predicaments on the bodies of white South African women. 
 I will not use clinical cases, but rather will use published texts as my case illustrations of 
somatic symptomology.   Throughout the project, I will highlight the method enacted by some of 
the theorists in order to articulate the unique ways of approaching narrative as a model for the 
clinical encounter.  I acknowledge that this transfer of “reading” a text to “reading” a human 
being in a clinical setting is not an easy one and due to the limitations of this project, I am unable 
to elaborate fully on how this process might play out.  I have settled on engaging in the process 
myself, as an experiment in order to see what I discover in the hopes of deciphering new, more 
complex, more attuned, more nuanced means by which the body can indeed be given voice in the 
clinical realm in a more substantive way.  If my method proves helpful, it has the potential to 
inform various aspects of the clinical encounter regarding treatment of somatic symptomology, 
including clinical training and the production of theories to explain and treat individuals 
experiencing somatic distress. 
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Why these three texts? 
 My primary site of curiosity is in the life and work of Olive Schreiner.  I have a deep 
interest in the ways that literature is able to express political themes via an exploration of the 
inner worlds of characters.  Olive Schreiner is a historical figure whose novel, The Story of an 
African Farm, is considered to be one of South Africa’s first published novels written by a 
woman.  Because my project is focused on the relationship between the unknowable/unsayable 
aspects of trauma legacies and its impact on the body, I consider her personal correspondences 
that elaborate on the themes presented in her fictional work.  Finally, I seek to draw a connection 
from Olive Schreiner as historical white colonial figure to the character of Lucy in JM Coetzee’s 
contemporary novel, Disgrace.  This connection allows me the opportunity to follow the line of 
thinking that involves a connection of legacies of colonialism via white women’s bodies in South 
Africa. Lucy as a fictional character possesses many similar qualities to her historical 
predecessor, Olive Schreiner, and therefore I seek to elaborate the ways in which legacies of 
colonialism in South Africa continue to impact the bodies and psyches of white South African 
women on both a conscious and unconscious level.  
Why South Africa? 
I will utilize several theories developed by feminists (Horrell and Horton) who are 
engaged in the intersection of literary theory, feminist theory and whiteness studies and whose 
work is located specifically in the context of South Africa.  A primary consideration for my 
thesis is:  why South Africa?  Why focus my exploration in the specific cultural context of the 
experience of white women in the colonial and postcolonial context of South Africa?  I chose 
this context for several reasons.  First, in lieu of a case study, I was interested in exploring 
culturally specific creative productions (narratives) that might be “read” in a similar way as a 
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more conventional psychoanalytic case study.  Second, South Africa (especially in relationship 
to Western discourses) is a place in which race and racism manifests in explicit and overt ways. 
In other words, my intervention, influenced by the work of feminists and whiteness studies 
theorists, is in part an attempt to complicate discourses around race, colonialism and violence in 
a cultural context where discourses around race are polarized and often conceptualized in 
dichotomies of good/bad, white/black, oppressor/oppressed.  Finally, I have a personal 
relationship to South Africa.  I spent nearly a year living there from 1999-2000 and I was deeply 
impacted by the complex and nuanced discourses and histories that emerged from that context.  
As a white person visiting a country so plagued by legacies of violence, oppression, racism and 
colonialism, I came away from the experience seeking a deeper understanding of these 
experiences as well as knowledge that I needed to implicate myself in the collective traumas 
enacted by white colonial agents.   
 To sketch the problem in very broad strokes, the anxiety we are always in danger of 
 dissociating, the evacuation of meaning and denial that we too easily succumb to, have to 
 do with dehumanization.  (Benjamin, 2012, p.211) 
 I will expand on this complex issue of “why South Africa?” and certainly “why white 
South African women?” in a subsequent section on intersubjective/relational theory.  In brief, 
one aspect of this thesis project is an exploration of the notion of witnessing of trauma and more 
precisely, to question the way in which somatic symptomology interacts with this process.  The 
challenge of truly witnessing the body in regards to trauma is explored by several 
intersubjective/relational theorists and proves to be significant to my thesis project.  Specifically, 
I attempt to question the legacy of colonialism on white women’s bodies and call into question 
the challenge of adequately witnessing these narratives of trauma transmission via the body by 
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both the subject (white South African women) and the “reader” or clinician (me).  It is my hope 
that in investigating the challenges of witnessing the impact of colonialism on whites in South 
Africa (both victim and victimizer), I might shed light on the difficulty of these white subjects 
and their witnesses to see their experiences as grievable  (Butler, J. 2004).  I will further question 
the possibility that white South African women’s subjectivities have been inadequately 
witnessed and therefore, the legacies of colonialism have potentially haunted these women in the 
form of splitting (as a result of inadequate mentalization) and somatic distress.  
Potential Bias 
 I anticipate that my engagement with Relational and Intersubjective theories might prove 
to be a site of potential bias.  Due to the structure and demands of intersubjective theory, it is 
essential for the clinician or, in this case, the reader, to position the self in relation to the client, 
or in this case, the text(s).  To avoid bias, I plan to position myself as one reader, one self, in 
regards to the textual analysis.  I aim to be specific about locating my biopsychosocial identity in 
order to enact transparency in regards to potential bias.  However, my project does draw on the 
theoretical works of many authors and in this regard, I position myself as one (admittedly) biased 
reader among many. In summary, I aim, throughout this project, to position myself as a white 
woman engaging in a project that involves an exploration of white identity in South Africa.     
Methodological Influences 
Psychoanalytic theory makes clear that the body is literally written on, inscribed… 
(Grosz, 1994, p.60) 
 Broadly speaking, as I have mentioned, the frame of analysis in my project is a 
psychoanalytically informed engagement with literary criticism.  I used my method to explore 
psychosomatic experiences (trauma in the body) of white South African women by looking at 
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this phenomenon in two published texts.  I did not use a patient as a case study due to the 
vulnerability of the topic.  As a result, I made the choice to experiment with a method of analysis 
that might demonstrate a capacity to allow space to elaborate on the complex themes and issues 
surrounding the treatment of patients with somatic symptomology without impact on a individual 
or group of individuals.  Instead of actual patients, I took the above-mentioned themes and 
applied them to fictional and non-fictional characters to reclaim the body as a site of analysis 
when considering collective trauma.  
 In my discussion I will integrate feminist and relational theories into an analysis of the 
effectiveness of my methodological approach to my “cases.”  In this section, I will specify the 
most salient theoretical frameworks (both feminist and relationally oriented) that impacted the 
development of my chosen method of analysis.   
 Haydee Faimberg (2012) and Dori Laub (2005) are analysts who have written extensively 
about their work with survivors (and children of survivors) of the Holocaust.  As a result of their 
years of work with these clients, both clinicians endorse the development and implementation of 
new tools in the analytic encounter that “give form, structure, and intelligibility to the 
incomprehensible past that does not have an ending” (Laub, p. 254). In their work and writing, 
Laub and Faimberg explore the mechanisms that challenge their capacity to adequately witness 
and hold both the sayable and unsayable aspects of trauma narratives/psychic pain of their 
clients.   
 Faimberg identifies the dialectical relationship between disavowal and the function of 
witnessing as the mechanism by which an impasse like “impossible mourning” comes into the 
analytic encounter (Faimberg, p.157).  Faimberg argues that disavowal (“a special feature of 
disavowal is that the nature of what is to be disavowed is known and unknown at the same 
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time”), which is often transmitted intergenerationally, occurs within client and analyst (p.162).  
 Laub and Faimberg believe that process of overcoming disavowal “liberates the function 
of witnessing”  (p.168).  This is no simple process however, and one of Faimberg’s most 
significant contributions to my thesis project methodology lies in her exploration of the 
challenge of interrupting the intergenerational traumatic transmission process.  She pinpoints the 
“disavowed aspect of the analysts’ own history” as one key reason that mourning and witnessing 
become seemingly impossible (p.166).  In essence Faimberg argues that both analyst and client 
are subject to the same desire to “deny the existence of things that ought not exist,” thus 
promoting the intergenerational transmission process, foreclosing a “life project for the future” 
and refuting the possibility of listening in more than one dimension (p.161 & 158).   
 Faimberg and Laub both address the strenuous challenges of working with traumatic and 
distressing psychic content.  Their desire to discover pathways for “render[ing] accessible to 
psychoanalysis material that would otherwise remain out of reach” is in line with the goals of my 
thesis project  (Faimberg, p. 159).  I am not addressing the horrors and legacy of the Holocaust, 
but rather the impact of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa.  The violence embedded in 
these moments induces a push towards disavowal.  My aim, like Laub and Faimberg, is to 
discover, within and along the margins of my “case material,” a space for witnessing, a learning 
to “listen to what is still unspoken, still in search of words,” in regards to the traumatic legacy of 
the colonial encounter in South Africa (Faimberg, p. 158).  
 I argue that psychoanalysis galvanizes, as no other discipline can, an understanding of 
 texts in their social, historical, and political contexts. I also show how close reading can 
 be a radical political practice through which heretofore unseen ideologies concealed 
 within works of film and literature can be exposed.  (Rashkin, 2009, p.1-2) 
 
 Esther Rashkin is a feminist psychoanalyst, author, and professor of French and 
Comparative Literature at the University of Utah.  She has written extensively on the application 
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of a psychoanalytic framework to the study of literature and film.  In an important essay, “The 
haunted child:  social catastrophe, phantom transmissions and the aftermath of collective 
trauma,” (1999), Rashkin outlines several important theoretical concepts which she further 
elaborates in her ongoing academic work on trauma transmission.  Much like Laub and 
Faimberg, Rashkin has worked extensively with Holocaust survivors and their families and is 
invested in exploring the complex mechanisms of trauma transmission as well as the challenges 
of adequately witnessing ensuing psychopathology and psychic distress.  While Faimberg and 
Laub contributed to this discussion notions of disavowal and the function of witnessing, Rashkin 
presents the application of psychoanalytically influenced literary criticism as radical political 
practice.  She sets her sights on comprehending the “symptom that narrates in ciphered form” as 
it relates to experiences of trauma (Rashkin, 1999, p. 445).  This endeavor has proven immensely 
useful in my examination of somatic symptomology, a frequently misunderstood and disavowed 
realm of symptomatology. 
 Rashkin is strongly influenced by the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Tortok, 
analysts who are responsible for developing the concept of the intergenerational transmission of 
the phantom, created by trauma (Abraham, Tortok & Rand, 1994).  Their fascinating work on 
transgenerational haunting is extensive and, due to the limitations of this project, will be 
summarized briefly.  Abraham and Tortok noted that certain events, often as a result of 
war/genocide/social catastrophe, are “experienced as too shameful to be articulated in speech” 
and as a result, many patients did not respond to “traditional techniques of analysis based on the 
Freudian concept of dynamic repression” (Rashkin, 1999, p. 435).  In a significant departure 
from Freudian and post-Freudian conceptualizations of psychopathology, Abraham and Tortok 
proposed that it was possible that their patients’ “resistant symptoms” were not necessarily 
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caused by the repression or concealment of something they themselves had experienced, but 
possibly were related to something experienced by another (usually a parent or caregiver) that 
was silently transmitted, “through cryptic language and behavior” into their unconscious (p. 
436).  This is a brief description of the phantom formation.  It represents the “silence or gap in 
the speech of someone else that ‘speaks’ as would a ventriloquist, through the words and acts of” 
the patient (p.436).  Much like W.R.D. Fairbairn’s (1964) endopsychic structural formulation, 
the phantom transmission functions to protect the parental ego.  However, in the phantom 
formulation, the “expelled or foreclosed” content of the parent’s unconscious is literally “buried 
alive, along with the shame attached to it, and transmitted in encrypted form into the child’s 
unconscious”  (p. 443).    
 Rashkin’s integration of Abraham and Tortok’s theories with the analysis of film and 
literature is likely the most influential force in my methodological approach for this thesis 
project.  Her work is creative and explodes open new possibilities.  In my discussion section I 
will explain how I worked with her notions of haunting, instrapsychic crypts, and the 
intergenerational transmission of phantoms in regards to my case material.  I aim to implicate the 
bodies of Lucy (from Coetzee’s Disgrace) and Olive Schreiner in Rashkin’s theoretical 
framework for the purposes of conducting my own phantom analysis as it relates to the traumatic 
legacies of colonialism. Specifically, the phantom analysis holds out the possibility of seeing the 
bodies of Lucy and Olive Schreiner as intrapsychic crypts, containing haunted (and often 
intolerably painful and irreconcilable) content of their ancestors.  I explore the potentiality of 
Olive’s unexplored/unsayable psychic distress as manifesting in the body of Lucy in Rashkin’s 
formulation of a phantom haunting.  Through this pairing, the joining of two white South African 
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women in proximity to each other, I seek to identify the ghostly remains of colonialism that 
might be encrypted in the postcolonial body of Lucy.   
In such a reciprocal affirmation of the other, especially acknowledgement of 
suffering that has been denied, there is an implicit affirmation that two or more humans 
are linked by a third.  This third contains or rests on certain principles: that suffering of 
humans matters, no matter what their different origins or status; that the recognition of 
suffering connects or reconnects us to the magnetic chain of humanity in which suffering 
is our common denominator.  (Benjamin, 2012, p. 208)   
 
 The work of Jessica Benjamin, a feminist relational psychoanalyst, is a final and 
significant influence in the cultivation of my methodological framework for this project.  
Benjamin’s essay, “Acknowledgement of collective trauma in light of dissociation and 
dehumanization” (2012), presents a compelling method for exploring the challenge of 
witnessing, recognizing and acknowledging the psychic distress caused by trauma.  Much like 
Laub, Faimberg and Rashkin, Benjamin recognizes the difficulty of “lifting of dissociation,” 
especially in the face of collective trauma (p. 208).  Additionally, like Laub and Faimberg, 
Benjamin is invested in asserting the fact that, in witnessing work, it is essential that clinicians 
must resist “denying what is unbearable and overwhelming” while “confronting our own 
dissociations” (p. 209).   
 As a Relational theorist and clinician, Benjamin’s framework impacted my methodology 
in the sense that she is invested in experiencing “all sides” of a person, thus always working to 
“maintain [an awareness of] the simultaneity of positions” (p. 211 & 210).  This positioning is 
important to my project in that I am working with the assumption that white South African 
women (in both colonial and postcolonial contexts) are often positioned (and experience 
themselves) as both victim and victimizer.  In her essay, Benjamin wonders about how one is to 
approach the problem of witnessing when it comes to individuals involved in collective traumas 
(such as the Holocaust or colonial violence) while also encountering the “problem of abandoning 
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those who feel guilty” (p.210).  This conundrum describes an essential underpinning of my thesis 
project.  Benjamin’s exploration of this complex issue, while attending to the positionality of the 
multiple selves of both analyst and patient, has been formative to my development of a 
methodological framework.  What Benjamin’s Relational frame offers this project’s 
methodological approach is her very curiosity about the multiple self parts of all individuals 
involved in collectively traumatic environments such as colonial and post-apartheid South 
Africa.  These multiple parts extend to and require an acknowledgement of somatic distress.  
Without this form of multiple-self witnessing, Benjamin warns, we as “witnesses” or clinicians, 
or researchers run the risk of disavowing or dissociating “painful and frightening parts in 
ourselves” thus contributing to the further transmission of trauma and violence generation after 
generation (p. 213).    
Criteria for evaluating the phenomenon 
1. Dialectics of disavowal and witnessing (H. Faimberg, D. Laub, J. Benjamin); 
2. Impossibility of mourning (H. Faimberg, D. Laub, E. Rashkin, J. Benjamin); 
3. Dissociation and the body (J. Benjamin, E. Rashkin); 
4. Physical body as an intrapsychic crypt (E. Rashkin) 
Themes I explore with my method 
1. Trauma transmission via the white female body, especially due to unknowable traumas 
from past and inadequate means for self-expression; 
2. Guilt, shame and unacknowledged desire as a legacy of the violence of colonialism as 
expressed by white South African women; 
3. Disavowal and dissociation as defenses in the face of the disappointments, violence and 








My interest in exploring the phenomenon of somatic preoccupation in adults emerged 
slowly over years of clinical work first with severely traumatized patients in a residential eating 
disorder and complex trauma treatment facility and while interning on an inpatient mental health 
unit of a regional hospital.  Over the course of these experiences, I regularly encountered the 
challenge of adequately bearing witness to the latent expressions of traumatic experience that 
appeared to be situated in the bodies of my clients.  I found myself and clinicians with whom I 
worked to be either puzzled by unexplained pains in the body or drawn to dismiss the pains as 
somatic symptomology (i.e.: fabricated preoccupations).   
 In taking time to consider this clinical impasse, I began to wonder if, as Uehara (2007) 
suggests, that some of my patients in pain were actually attempting to engage me in a narrative 
that only physical pain could express, a pain engagement narrative that contained traces of 
intolerable familial traumas.  Furthermore, if we as clinicians bear witness with openness, I 
surmised that perhaps somatic symptoms might function as dissociated narratives of trauma, 
ultimately revealing traces of unspeakable experiences. 
 In this section, I summarize the clinical literature addressing somatic symptomology in 
adults.  Following this summary, I describe my case material and its relevance to the issues 
raised in my literature review.  Specifically, I aim to situate my identified phenomenon of the 
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intergenerational transmission of trauma via the body in the context of the demonstrated need for 
further clinical understandings of somatic symptomology.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
By ignoring the coherent expression of unconscious grief and pain as a diagnostic issue, 
we as clinicians miss an opportunity to more deeply understand the complexity and nuanced 
nature of trauma transmission and its impact on bodies and minds. This assertion is supported by 
Uehara (2007) and Greco (1998), who call for a more compassionate and nuanced clinical 
engagement in problematizing popularly held notions of illness and health. My research has 
focused on reviewing literature that addresses the phenomenon of somatic preoccupation (also 
known as medically unexplained sickness). An initial review of pertinent medical literature on 
somatic preoccupation (Crombez et al., 2006; Epstein et al 2009; Warsop, 2009) shows a focus 
on the healthcare-cost/challenges and treatment resistance posed by clients with medically 
unexplained symptoms. A limitation of the current literature is the lack of studies on the etiology 
of somatic symptomology as will be further discussed in the literature review.  While recent 
Posttraumatic Stress research (Sansone et al., 2009; van der Kolk, 1994, 2000) explores the fact 
that traumatic memory is stored in affective (implicit) memory and cannot often be accessed or 
described in language or visual modes, many PTSD treatment modalities still emphasize 
development of a cohesive, coherent and linear trauma narrative (that reveals unearthed 
repressed memories) as a hallmark of trauma resolution.  
In reviewing the literature, it is evident that more effective treatment 
modalities/approaches could be developed if informed by research regarding the cause and 
effects of somatic preoccupation in client populations, as well as clinicians’ resistance to 
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exploring psychosomatic symptomology (Creed et al., 2012; Dimsdale, 2009; Sansone et al., 
2009).  
 Empirical literature 
Of the available body of research on adult populations with somatic preoccupations, nine 
empirical studies will be reviewed here.  All studies are limited in that they rely on participants’ 
self-report of somatic symptoms and traumatic experiences. I will review the pertinent empirical 
studies and follow with an overview of the theoretical literature.   
Somatic preoccupations without medically confirmable physical findings are viewed by 
the psychiatric and medical establishment in a critical fashion as pathology expressed (if criteria 
is met) as a Somatoform disorder (Creed, et al., 2012).  Due to this perceived indecipherability of 
somatic symptomology, “our knowledge of its etiology is incomplete” (p.312).  I began my 
research with an interest in exploring the ways in which the psychiatric and medical professions 
relate to and “treat” somatic complaints (alternately termed psychosomatic illness, somatoform 
disorder or somatic preoccupations) in contemporary mental health settings (Sansone et al., 
2001, p.39).  Additionally, I was interested in how physical symptoms are linked to mental 
pathology and, in particular, whether current research perceives coherence in unspeakable bodily 
symptomology (Sansone, et al., 2001).  This led me to seek out research that reflected current 
understandings of discourses around somatic symptomology.   
One significant area of existing research involves the connection between adult somatic 
preoccupation and the experience of trauma during childhood (Creed et al., 2012; Sansone, 
Weiderman & Sansone, 2001; Sansone, Weiderman, Tahir & Buckner, 2009).  A contemporary 
study (Creed et al., 2012) conducted in North West England utilized quantitative methods 
employing the Somatic Symptom Inventory (SSI) to evaluate adult participant’s risk factors for 
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persistent somatic symptoms.  The study identified the following risk factors for multiple 
somatic symptoms:  Less than 12 years of education, separated status, widowed or divorced, 
reporting psychological abuse during childhood, co-existing medical illnesses, anxiety and 
depression.  Persistent SSI scores in a one-year follow up study, using the same methods, helped 
support the initial finding that the total number of somatic symptoms reflects a dimension of 
somatic distress that is distinct from anxiety and depression.   
While this study did not measure psychological mechanisms of intervention and is 
consequently not directly applicable to evaluating clinical interventions, it did utilize a highly 
recognized tool such as the SSI to evaluate a complex set of symptomology.  Of significance is 
that this study posits that a high somatic symptom score is “best seen as a phenomenon of 
multifactorial etiology with interacting psychological, social and biological factors” (p. 316).  
Therefore, in addition to connecting psychological abuse during childhood to somatic 
symptomology in adulthood, researchers assert that a biopsychosocial framework is best suited 
for addressing the needs of individuals with high SSI scores. 
Two studies (Sansone et al., 2001 & Sansone et al., 2009) engage in two distinct research 
methodologies to examine the connection between childhood trauma and adult somatic 
symptomology.  In the first study (2001), researchers utilized a path analytic approach to 
evaluate the indirect and direct correlation between somatic preoccupation in adults who also 
have experienced childhood trauma, depression and borderline symptomology.  The study 
attempted to answer the question: are certain types of trauma or particular combinations of 
trauma more likely to precipitate somatic preoccupation in adulthood?  Researchers found that 
childhood trauma appears to independently put one at risk for somatic preoccupation.  
Furthermore, findings from this study indicate that the variables of childhood trauma, borderline 
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personality symptomology, acute depression and somatic preoccupation are all at least 
moderately related when placed into a sequential model.  This study posits some explanation for 
the reasons that resolution of somatic preoccupation symptomology is so difficult to achieve.  
This is due, in large part to the association of somatic preoccupation with childhood trauma.  
Treatment for this type of trauma is often “multidimensional” and, when combined with 
treatment resistant somatic symptomology, patients are often regarded as “difficult-to-treat” 
cases (p.44). 
In a follow up study, researchers (Sansone, Weiederman & Tahir, 2009) utilized a cross-
sectional convenience sample to survey adults who were seen as outpatients in an internal 
medicine setting in a mid-sized Midwestern town. Participants were asked “Yes/No” questions 
regarding the five types of childhood trauma (physical, sexual and emotional, the witnessing of 
violence and physical neglect).  The study measured somatic preoccupations using the Bradford 
Somatic Inventory.  The researchers found that both physical and emotional abuses demonstrated 
strong correlations with scores on the Bradford Somatic Inventory.   
This second study is significant in that it is the first to investigate the individual 
relationship between particular childhood traumas and somatic preoccupation in adulthood.  
Researchers posit that physical and emotional abuse during childhood may be related to somatic 
preoccupation in adulthood.  The researchers also call for further research “exploring mediating 
variables such as the role of body image disturbance” (p.230). 
A similarly oriented study (Stein et al., 2003) was conducted in a Veteran’s Affairs 
primary care outpatient clinic with women.  These women self-reported (via questionnaire) their 
sexual assault history, their levels of health anxiety and any existence of somatic symptoms.  The 
findings of this cross-sectional study indicated a strong association between sexual trauma 
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exposure and somatic symptoms, illness attitudes and healthcare utilization in women (p.178).  
However, the study did not test for causal mechanisms.  Furthermore, the health anxiety and 
somatic symptoms could not be proven to be related directly to the sexual assault.  Much like the 
2009 Sansone study, this study posits that the experience of sexual assault early in life might lead 
to disturbances in “somatic perception and body image” (p. 181).  
While significantly impaired by poor methodological organization and its limiting 
population of 18 year old college students, researchers (Kneipp, Kelly & Wise, 2011) did 
confirm their hypothesis that highly impaired self-reference, the female gender and high levels of 
anger/irritability do lead to distorted body image in traumatized individuals.  These findings echo 
other studies (Sansone et al., 2009; Stein et al., 2003) in regards to the mediating factor of body 
image disturbance as emerging as a result of trauma. 
In addition to connecting somatic preoccupation in adulthood to childhood trauma and 
possible subsequent body image disturbance, contemporary empirical literature also explores the 
role of alexithymia (Farooq, Gahir, Okyere, Sheikh & Oyebode, 1995; Smith & Johnsson, 1997) 
and cultural difference (Farooq, Gahir, Okyere, Sheikh & Oyebode, 1995; Fenta, Hyman, 
Rourke, Moon & Noh 2010) as possible explanatory factors in the presentation of somatic 
symptomology. 
The term alexithymia was first coined in 1973 by P.E. Sifneos to describe certain 
patients’ inability to seize the essence of their own inner state as well as that of other people 
(Smith & Johnsson, 1997).  Alexithymia is a psychoanalytic concept that is frequently linked to 
patients with psychosomatic preoccupation. An important empirical study on the relationship of 
alexithymia and somatic symptomology (Smith & Johnsson, 1997) summarized a series of 
experiments conducted with adults who had been diagnosed with Crohn’s disease, Ulcerative 
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Colitis and/or anorexia/bulimia.  Researchers used the concept of alexithymia in a process-
oriented frame of reference to explore the participants’ relationship to the constantly recurring 
microprocesses that shape our reality at any given moment.  This report is limited in that it 
utilizes such a variety of tools and experiments with the sample and therefore the report reads as 
overly complex.  One strength of this study is the fact that the researchers continually return to a 
common thread: the connection between parental relations and psychosomatic symptoms, which 
is very clearly stated in the material. Researchers found that all participants engaged in 
alexithymic strategies that revealed a common tendency to avoid identification of emotions.  
While strategies of alexithymia varied across the three diagnostic categories, researchers do 
assert that all participants, in terms of microprocess, demonstrate blocked access to the 
emotionally rich preconscious early phases of development.    
Interestingly, the concept of alexithymia is not dissimilar from the discussion 
explanations in several empirical studies (Farooq et al., 1995; Fenta et al., 2010) on the inherent 
nature of certain cultural groups to be inclined to express emotions somatically.  Both studies 
examined specific refugee populations and attempted to determine if somatic symptomology was 
linked to cultural specificity.  One cross-sectional study (Fenta et al., 2010) examined the 
occurrence and correlates of somatic symptoms in a random sample of 342 adult Ethiopian 
immigrants residing in Toronto, Canada.  Study participants were asked to complete the 
somatization disorder module of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule.  A limitation is that all data 
were self-reported.  In a multivariate linear regression analysis controlling for mental disorder, 
self-reported somatic symptom level was significantly associated with older age, pre-migration 
trauma, post-migration stressful life events and limited English language fluency, with the 
association between pre-migration trauma and somatic symptoms being largely mediated by the 
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onset of PTSD. Depression and PTSD were found to be directly associated with somatic 
symptoms.  Based on the findings of this study, researchers assert that there may be a culturally 
inclined tendency in Ethiopian immigrant communities to present with somatic symptoms.   
A much more dated study (Farooq et al., 1995) utilized the Bradford Somatic Inventory 
and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale to investigate the comparative rates of somatic 
complaints between one hundred and ninety-five Asian and Caucasian patients in a primary care 
setting in England.  Participants were adults between the ages of 16 and 65.  The study found that 
Asian patients reported significantly more somatic and depressive symptoms than the Caucasian 
patients.  At times this study does not make it clear that, in fact, the “Asian” patients in this study 
were actually individuals originating from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh living in England.  
This could lead to possible misunderstandings.  A strength is that the researchers insured that 
study participants were given the opportunity to self-complete the questionnaires in both English 
or Urdu.  Patients who were illiterate were read questions aloud in their native tongue.  Much 
like the contemporary Fenta (2010) study, this research shows empirical data supporting the 
claim that ethnicity is a significant variable in the experience of somatic preoccupation.  This 
study, while not utilizing the term alexithymia (Smith & Johnsson, 1997), highlights the 
significant impact of language and coherence (especially in terms of immigrant experiences) as it 
relates to the presentation of somatic symptomology in primary care settings. 
An empirical study that evokes similar themes expressed in the theoretical literature is a 
2012 study by Danise et al., that focused on the specific symptomology of chronic fatigue 
syndrome (CFS) amongst adult sets of twins.  CFS is a clinical condition characterized by 
“unexplained prolonged and disabling fatigue, musculoskeletal pain, sleep disturbances, 
impairments in mood, and neurocognitive difficulties” (p.250).  This study investigated the co-
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occurrence of CFS, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and trauma symptoms.  Data were 
gathered utilizing a standardized questionnaire that included the Impact of Events Scale (IES).  
The researchers found that a lifetime diagnosis of CFS was associated strongly with both chronic 
PTSD and current traumatic symptoms.   
This study supports already existing research on the comorbidity of CFS with PTSD.  
Researchers suggest that clinicians should carefully consider the “complex nature of CFS as it 
relates to other conditions . . . including stress related conditions” (p.255).  This assertion 
supports the theoretical work of Uehara (2007) and Greco (1998) in its proposal that more 
clinical investigations into the precise nature of complex body symptomology should be 
explored.   
As I sated previously, my project emerged out of a sense of frustration with the 
limitations of contemporary empirical research to address the etiology of somatic preoccupation 
in adults in a nuanced way.  As a result, I turned to an in depth exploration of contemporary 
theoretical models to attempt to discover new ways of making meaning of somatic 
symptomology.  My theoretical sources provide an overview of several conceptual frameworks 
for understanding and treating somatic symptomology in relationship to trauma.  With the 
exception of the work of van der Kolk (1994), my theoretical sources (Bowlby 1969 & 1973; 
Breuer & Freud, 1893-95; Fongay, 2001; Greco, 1998; Herman, 1997; McDougall, 1989 &1974, 
Somatic Disorders DSM 5 Workgroup, 2012; Taylor, 1987 & 2003; Uhera 2007) are admittedly 
limited in scope as they are focused on several contemporary psychoanalytically informed 
categories that explicate the etiology of somatic symptomology: attachment theory, somatic 
trauma theory, object relations, psychobiological research and narrative analysis of somatic 
symptomology.  I do not, for instance, engage with theories that discuss treatment strategies nor 
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do I engage with contemporary theories such as cognitive behavioral theory as my project is 
rooted firmly in a psychoanalytic framework.  Furthermore, due to the limits of this project, I 
will provide an overview of the above mentioned theoretical frameworks in this section and, in 
my subsequent theory chapters, I will explore two theoretical model’s application to 
understanding somatic symptomology in depth. 
Theoretical literature 
Freud and hysteria  
There is a normal, appropriate reaction to excitation caused by very vivid and 
irreconcilable ideas—namely, to communicate them by speech.  We meet the same urge 
as one of the basic factors of a major historical institution—the Roman Catholic 
confessional.  Telling things is a relief; it discharges tension even when the person to 
whom they are told is not a priest and even when no absolution follows.  If the excitation 
is denied this outlet it is sometimes converted into a somatic phenomenon, just as is the 
excitation belonging to traumatic effects.”  (Breuer & Freud, 1955) 
 
Somatic symptomology cannot be explored without an acknowledgement of Freud’s 
contributions on the concept of hysteria.  Freud initially attributed hysteria to sexual trauma, but 
he later came to see the symptoms as an expression of unconscious fantasy that had originated in 
the oedipal sexual and aggressive fantasies of early childhood. And rather than the symptom 
being simply the translation of an instinctual charge into the body, it was now seen as a disguised 
expression, via conversion, of an unconscious fantasy (Taylor, 2003).  When an intolerable 
fantasy arose in a patient, Freud argued, a conversion process occurred in which the unconscious 
was able to block libidinal and aggressive satisfactions.  However, as a result of the buildup of 
these urges, somatic symptoms (symbolic evidence of these blocked up neurotic drives 
unfulfilled) in a patient, usually a woman, would manifest.  Because in Freud’s second theory, 
the fantasy was an incest fantasy, it was unacceptable to the conscious mind (Breuer & Freud, 
1955).  In addition to the topographical model of the mind, Freud further proposed that hysterical 
25 
 
conversion created manifest somatic symptoms.  Thus inhibitions of bodily functioning such as 
constipation, impotence, frigidity, psychogenic sterility, anorexia, insomnia and so on, have 
come to be considered as closely allied to classical conversion symptoms and function as 
symbolic solutions to unconscious conflict (McDougall, 1974).  
Psychobiological  
These repressions of fantasy life are again addressed in a Graeme Taylor’s (1987) 
contemporary psychobiological model of psychosomatic medicine.  His model postulates that 
somatic symptomology might be explained as “concomitant psychological and physiological 
responses to separation and object loss, but these mental and bodily events are considered 
causally related and are presumed due to the emotional upheaval following disruption of an 
attachment bond” (p.280). Taylor focuses on the interaction between psychological and 
biological factors as an explanation for somatic symptomology (adult disregulation) such as 
rheumatoid arthritis, bronchial asthma, peptic ulcer disease, and hypertension.  The adult 
disregulation resulting in psychosomatic diseases might be explained, Taylor explains, much like 
the disregulation we witness in infants—in which a person in adulthood relies “excessively on 
another person to maintain their psychobiological equilibrium” (p.285). This contemporary 
argument involves a consideration of self-object issues: 
dependent people have suffered deficiencies in their earliest object relationships; 
their inner worlds lack adequate representation of a well-functioning self-object unit that 
normally would substitute for the external mother and provide self-regulatory functions.  
To compensate for this, many of these people retain a symbiotic involvement with the 
mother or form a substitute symbiotic self-object relationship with a key figure.  Because 
of the withdrawal of specific sensorimotor regulators hidden within the many complex 
interactions of the relationship, they are at greater risk for developing physical disease 
following separation and object loss. (p.285) 
 
Contemporary Somatic Therapies 
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Bessel van der Kolk’s (1994) seminal article “The body keeps the score: Memory and the 
evolving psychobiology of posttraumatic stress on the impact of trauma on the body,” explores 
the ways that trauma memories become implicit and manifest somatically in the body. He 
describes the mechanisms by which individuals with PTSD, unable to utilize declarative 
memory, often channel unprocessed emotions via the body. van der Kolk’s research on trauma 
survivors is highly impacted by recent developments in neuroscience concerning how the brain is 
impacted and organized by traumatic experience.  One recent research study of van der Kolk’s 
(2000) found that subjects with both dissociative disorders and somatoform disorders utilize 
defensive responses that mimic those observed in animals under attack.   
This fight or flight response has, in recent years, been linked to the impact of trauma on 
the body and led to the development of many body-focused treatment approaches that integrate a 
body-mind framework.  Contemporary body psychotherapies (eg: Sensorimotor therapy, 
SomaCentric Dialoging, Hakomi, Somatic Experiencing, SHIP (Spontaneous Healing 
Intrasystemic Process), Internal Family Systems, Mindfulness-based body practices, 
Craniosacrial therapy and EMDR) are influenced by the earlier work of Pierre Janet (1977) and 
Wilhelm Reich (1949) who took note of the body’s response to psychological stress.  Bessel van 
der Kolk (1994 & 2007) and Judith Herman (1997) are just two of many theorists who have 
followed in the footsteps of Janet and Reich in developing theories and treatments that 
acknowledge the non-integrated sensory experiences of trauma. The above-mentioned treatment 
modalities have gained traction in recent years, especially in light of the preponderance of 
empirical research on the study of effective treatments for war-related PTSD in the United States 
(Wolfe et al., 1999). 
Attachment Theory and Alexithymia  
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John Bowlby’s writing (1969 & 1973) on attachment behavior and its impact on infant 
emotional regulation maintains a strong bearing on contemporary thinking in regards to 
psychosomatic symptomology.  Of the various attachment styles, insecure attachment, as a result 
of unpredictable responsiveness of an infant’s caregiver, is often linked to adult 
psychopathological manifestations of somatic symptoms (Fonagy, 2011).    
In these instances, insecurity of attachment may be associated with an arrest in 
affect development, or with a regression, so that emotions are connected only weakly 
with images and words and are experienced mainly as poorly differentiated somatic 
sensations and motoric excitations (Krystal, 1997). This may result in alexithymia and a 
proneness to somatization or other medical and psychiatric disorders associated with 
affective dysregulation. (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 31) 
 
Contemporary attachment theorist, Peter Fonagy (2001) furthers the work of early 
attachment theorists by positing that psychoanalytic theory has much to learn from attachment 
theory methodologies.  Fonagy’s work has implications for contemporary understandings 
concerning the etiology of somatic symptomology. One of his primary contributions to this 
conversation includes his discussion of mentalization, or, reflective functioning.  Fonagy argues 
that an infant’s capacity for reflective functioning is impacted by the quality of attachment 
relationships (2001).  Securely attached infants acquire reflective function, or “the tendency to 
incorporate mental state attributions into internal working models of self-other relationships,” via 
the caregiver’s appropriate observation of the child’s mental state, the capacity of the caregiver 
to hold and contain the child’s inner experience, the caregiver’s ability to “reflect with 
understanding their child’s inner experience” (p.166 & 167). Disruptions in the development of 
adequate reflective functioning (as seen in children and adults who reflect disorganized, avoidant 
or insecure attachment styles), can inhibit verbal thought, or the capacity for language to 
explicate internal emotional states as well as diminish affect regulation (2001).  These 
observations are significant when it comes to somatic symptomology and, in essence, link 
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attachment theory, alexithymia, somatic preoccupation and psychoanalytic object relations 
theories.     
Object Relations 
The psychoanalytic perspective on psychosomatic illness has its own historical trajectory.  
However, for the purposes of this research project, I focus on contemporary object relations 
theories concerning the treatment of somatic preoccupations in the psychoanalytic context. One 
particularly salient work by Joyce McDougall (1989) presents an explanation as to why “severe 
psychosomatic afflictions, as well as the psychosomatic vulnerabilities that are part of 
everybody’s potential problems, are often regarded as dubious areas for psychoanalytic 
investigation” (p.9).  McDougall observes that several issues contribute to this stance.  She states 
that there is often an assumption that psychosomatic illness is viewed as an indication that “we 
[analysts] are dealing with an archaic form of mental functioning that does not use language” (p. 
10).  She adds that this position is not easily adopted by practicing psychoanalysts.  Furthermore, 
McDougall argues that, from the perspective of countertransference, “the fact that psychosomatic 
phenomena often escape the analyst’s understanding constitutes a narcissistic affront and may 
lead certain analysts to feel that psychosomatic problems should be dealt with elsewhere” (p. 11).  
McDougall does offer an alternate view, cultivated after years of practice that argues: 
when an adult unconsciously represents his/her body limits as ill defined or 
unseparated from others, emotional experiences with a significant other (or sometimes 
anybody who happens fortuitously to mobilize the body’s memory of early psychic 
trauma) may result in psychosomatic explosion, as though in these circumstances there 
existed only one body for two people. (p. 10)  
 
McDougall’s work proposes a means of understanding the relationship of body, trauma 
and psychoanalytic object relations.  It is one of the clearest conceptualizations of the etiology of 
somatic preoccupation and requires further research.   
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Contemporary DSM-V Formulation of Somatic Symptomology  
The new DSM-5 manual is expected to be published in 2013 and proposes several 
significant changes to the cluster of somatic disorders.  Most significantly, based on clinical 
feedback, the somatic disorders workgroup determined that DSM-IV somatoform diagnoses 
(Somatization Disorder, Somatoform Disorder NOS, Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder, 
Hypochondriasis and the Pain Disorders) “are so flawed that complete restructuring of these 
diagnoses is required” (n.p.).  The new DSM-5 suggests that, because of “the implicit mind-body 
dualism and the unreliability of assessments of “medically unexplained symptoms,” the focus of 
the new diagnosis of Somatic Symptom Disorders will de-emphasize these medically 
unexplained symptoms.  These proposed changes indicate both the relevance and trajectory of 
my identified phenomenon.  
Narrative/Foucault 
Finally, two works by Uehara (2007) and Greco (1998) argue that it is precisely in the 
medical and psychiatric models’ inability to explain and treat psychosomatic “illness” that an 
opportunity for creative narrative analysis of somatic preoccupation narratives emerges. 
Uehara (2007) examines the clinical literature alongside refugee pain engagement 
narratives to explore more effective and humane treatment approaches for refugees who have 
experienced severe and persistent trauma.  Uehara’s work in challenging the clinical literature on 
trauma, the refugee experience and the experience of intractable pain is significant to my 
research in the sense that she calls into question the usefulness of current literature that argues 
that the “survivor’s attempt at social engagement is often swept under the rubric of help-seeking”  




disturbing phenomenology catching us up in the experience of nearness to another’s 
 exquisite and incorrigible suffering; permitting a glimpse of the [survivor’s] effort to 
 engage and cutting us off from conventional and taken-for-granted forms of objectifying, 
 theorizing and distance making. (p.353)  
 
Another related theoretical work (Greco, 1998) employs Michel Foucault’s archeological 
and genealogical methods to the study of the complexity of the concept of illness in 
contemporary medical models.  She pays particular attention to discourses around the concept of 
psychosomatics and argues, in a similar fashion as Uehara, that psychosomatic symptomology 
and narratives provide an opportunity to problematize rigid notions of health/illness and 
mind/body dichotomies. 
Both Uehara and Greco assert that clinicians must challenge the esteemed role of 
representation and the coherent truthful accounting of trauma in the clinical sphere. They call for 
clinicians to consider narrative therapeutic approaches that involve collaboration between 
clinician and client to make meaning of seemingly incoherent symptoms and memories. These 
theories attempt to demonstrate that before prescribing treatment, a more in depth, nuanced and 
creative understanding of the language of the traumatized person via the body must be achieved.   
Case Material 
As I outlined in the literature review, somatic symptomology is an area of clinical lack of 
understanding with a dearth in effective and attuned treatment modalities.  In an attempt to 
address this clinical impasse, I have chosen one very specific lens through which I aim to more 
fully comprehend the ways in which somatic symptomology functions.  Specifically, in response 
to my review of the literature, I identified a phenomenon I call the “alexithymia of the colonial 
predicament.”  This formulation is one framework for understanding the function of the body in 
pain in the context of intergenerational trauma transmission.  I applied this framework to my case 
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material to discover the unknowable or unspeakable (i.e.: alexithymic) dissociated aspects of the 
experience of white South African women in a colonial and postcolonial context.   
In this section I provide a brief overview of the cultural context of South Africa in order 
to situate my case material.  Following this overview, I describe the two South African fictional 
and non-fictional literary works that constitute my case material.  As I described in my 
methodology section, this project is an experiment in evaluating the clinically relevant 
phenomenon of the intergenerational transmission of trauma via the body by exploring its 
applicability to my identified case material. 
Cultural Context 
South Africa is a racially diverse country dominated by black African populations who 
have various cultural and linguistic traditions. South Africa has long history of colonial and 
apartheid oppression of African people by a white minority (Dutch, British, Afrikaaners).  1994 
marked the end of apartheid rule and the first democratic election in which Nelson Mandela 
became president.  In 1996, a new constitution was adopted.  The Bill of Rights had the intention 
to ensure that human rights were at the heart of all legislation and that human rights abuses 
would never again occur in South Africa.  The “Rainbow Nation’s” constitution and susequent 
legistlation aimed at correcting a half century of deliberately discriminatory policies in 
education, housing, employment, politics, and welfare, [and] has resulted in one of the largest 
social welfare systems in the world, a population that still struggles to overcome the legacy of 
apartheid, and a country that struggles to integrate the previously oppressed black population into 
the economy (Potts, 2012). 
One key event that I would like to highlight in my very abridged summary of South 
African history is the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, which led to the 
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establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and subsequent hearings.  In 
brief, the commission provided a national forum in which apartheid-era perpetrators could 
publically speak truth to their crimes and offer apology to victims.  The TRC’s aims were lofty 
and the goals involved the collective reconciliation of past traumas via truth telling/testimony.  
The TRC’s aims have, in many ways, been incorporated into the rhetoric of the New South 
Africa—a Rainbow Nation with a progressive constitution.  Many of the underlying goals and 
outcomes of the TRC are challenged and wrestled with in the contemporary novel that I will 
discuss in the following section.    
Case Material 
The case material for my project consists of two works written by white South African 
writers impacted by a country with a legacy of colonial violence, racial segregation and 
oppression, gender violence, struggles over national identity and land rights.  In their own ways 
and in their own historical moments (late 1880’s and 1980/90’s), Olive Schreiner and J.M. 
Coetzee attempt to describe the impact of these massive forces on their own internal landscape 
and the lives of their fellow citizens.  Both Coetzee and Schreiner are recognized as two of the 
most prominent figures in the white South African literary tradition (Devarnne, 2009).  Due to 
the limitations of this project, I am only able to engage in a small sampling of Schreiner and 
Coetzee’s extensive bodies of work.  It is my hope that I can form links across time between 
these bodies of work to demonstrate the means by which the intergenerational transmission of 
trauma (in the case of my project as explicated somatically) and the complex legacies of 
colonialism in South Africa come alive in the writings of Schreiner and Coetzee. 
Olive Schreiner, born in 1855 in a Wesleyan mission house in rural South Africa, was the 
ninth child of Rebecca Lyndall and Gottlob Schreiner (Berkman, 1979).  She was one of the 
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seven of their twelve children to survive childhood and especially mourned the loss of her two 
year old sister Ellie at age nine.  Schreiner’s father was a missionary in a stern Evangelical 
tradition.  While in South Africa, her father was unsuccessful in living up to the standards of 
missionary life set forth by the London Missionary Society (he was forced to engage in private 
trading to support his family and balance out the poverty-stricken conditions his family was left 
in due to his meager missionary salary) (Berkman, 1979).  As a result of economic hardship, 
Schreiner was sent (at age 11) to live away from her family and began work as a governess to 
Boer families at the age of 15.  Her early childhood was marked by exacting moral standards and 
a rigorous physical environment of the rural Cape Colony.  Schreiner, later in life, reported that 
nearly any infraction of hers was met with “corporal punishment or humiliating criticism” (p.6). 
Schreiner did not receive a formal education, but rather was taught by her mother, a 
woman she described as possessing “a brilliant mind,” but someone who was also “bigoted, cold 
and forbidding” (p.6).  At an early age, Schreiner rejected the religious faith of her parents and 
possibly as a result of experiencing economic hardship, hunger and lack of adequate employment 
opportunities as a woman, espoused feminism somewhat independently.  During her years as a 
traveling governess in rural South Africa, Schreiner wrote two books, Undine (1928) and The 
Story of an African Farm.  She later published African Farm in 1883 under the pseudonym 
Ralph Iron and the novel was an instant commercial success in England (Bristow, 1991). 
Of particular significance to my project is the well documented story of Olive Schreiner’s 
struggles with both physical and mental illness.  Throughout her adult life she is said to have 
suffered from “complex and agonizing personal insecurities, craving for intellectual and 
emotional intimacy. . . [and] periods of acute, even suicidal, depression”  (p.9).  Many 
biographers of Schreiner’s have attributed the above mentioned psychic distress to her 
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development of chronic bronchial asthma, multiple miscarriages and an eventual heart condition.  
Biographers (including her husband Cronwright-Schreiner) have also been known to build “up a 
picture of her as a restless asthmatic whose respiratory debility was a symptom of unfulfilled or 
thwarted sexual passions”  (Bristow, p. xxv).   In subsequent chapters, I will refer to Schreiner’s 
personal letters that frequently reference her physical and emotional distress.   
In the 1990’s scholars renewed their interest in the work of Olive Schreiner and focused 
particularly on three aspects of her identity: her thoughts on feminism and Marxism, her 
unconventional views on marriage and women’s sexuality (especially her 
relationship/correspondence with “venturesome figures” such as Havelock Ellis, Eleanor Marx, 
Edward Carpenter and Karl Pearson) and her anti-colonialist stance (p.9).  Schreiner is often 
“lauded for seeing what was blindingly obvious to many outside a European elite:  that capitalist 
development and colonial rule imposed appalling costs [for both black Africans and white 
women colonialists]”  (Bradford, 2004, p.182).  Critics of her work alternately praise her for her 
forward thinking socialist-feminist stance and her ability to “articulate the existential colonial 
angst” of her fellow African colonizers and equally challenge the apparent “insensitivity to 
native life and ethnic differences,” and a “transcendental justification for the ownership of the 
[black South African] land”  (Gorak, 1992, p. 69; Bristow, 1991, p. xvii; Devarenne, 2009, p. 
628).   
Schreiner shows that colonization has imported into Africa its own conflicts, its own 
 anxieties, its own inner darkness.  To light up this darkness with a hand-made, hand-held 
 torch: this, as she sees it, is the fearful but necessary task of the newly awakening 
 postcolonial self.  (Gorak, 1992, p. 71) 
 
In spite of how one relates to these criticisms, Schreiner is undoubtedly a famous white 
South African writer and her novel, The Story of an African Farm, is often cited as the first 
“distinctly feminist fiction in English” (Bristow, p.viii).  The novel is described by one noted 
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historian of South African Literature (Chapman, 1996) as “cluster[ed] around a web of emotions:  
loss and betrayal in love, woman’s alienation, guilt and the constriction of the ardent spirit in the 
arid physical and mental conditions of the colony”  (p. 134).  The “web” to which Chapman 
refers is an apt conceptualization of a difficult to summarize novel.  It is a novel in which time 
and conventional narrative are challenged by Schreiner’s seeming interest in “showing the 
actions, thoughts and moods of these isolated people, rather than telling us exactly how they 
function”  (Bristow, ix).  African Farm is a novel centered in the ambiguous, rural and barren 
landscape of Dutch-Afrikaans colonial life and involves a “plot of comings and goings and the 
sudden juxtapositions of different planes of experience”  (p.135).  Intentionally disjointed, this 
novel follows the life of several central characters from childhood until their deaths in early 
adulthood.   
The novel significantly emphasizes the inner life of Lyndall, described as a “cruel 
shepherdess” and Waldo, “a philosophical shepherd”  (Gorak, p.54).  The relentlessly seeking 
and free-spirited protagonists of the novel, Waldo and Lyndall, are concerned with hopes for a 
transcendent life, a means of circumventing the poverty and oppression of their existence on the 
Karoo.  Lyndall, an exceptionally smart and self-educated orphan, seeks meaning in the form of 
challenging the conventions of womanhood and Waldo, essentially a white indentured servant, 
seeks his life’s meaning via spirituality.  The relationship between these two characters, in the 
particular landscape in which Schreiner places them, is an opportunity for Schreiner to “explore, 
in a self-consciously transcendent way, the natural spaces that both restrict her characters and 
anthropomorphically express the expansiveness of their desires and aspirations”  (Devarenne, p. 
627).   
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Despite these expansive desires, Schreiner’s protagonists, “the characters with the 
greatest moral strengths,” are unable to achieve their transcendent dreams except in death 
(Bristow, xi).  These morally exceptional characters, much like Schreiner herself (anti-
imperialist, an early feminist), are “the ones who enjoy the least material gain” and are 
“inevitably compromised”  (Bristow, xi, xviii).  While my focus is on Schreiner's personal 
correspondences, the disjointed and irreconcilable narrative in African Farm reflects significant 
themes in Olive's inner life.  The social structures within which the characters, like Schreiner 
herself, exist, does not reflect or reward these morally exceptional characteristics.  Colonial life 
then, is explored and what is extrapolated is overwhelmingly dissatisfaction. 
J.M. Coetzee, one of South Africa’s most renowned and controversial contemporary 
white writers, describes Schreiner’s African Farm as a “critique of colonial culture” in that it 
“distinguishes between the farm and nature”  (Poyner, p. 6).  Coetzee also situates himself within 
this anti-pastoral genre with his fictional writing working “not only to demythologize white 
South African’s relationship to the land but [including] apartheid South Africa’s other voices. . . 
voices of silence and subjugation”  (p. 6).  For the purposes of this project, I will explore this 
possible kinship between Schreiner and Coetzee via an investigation of one of Coetzee’s most 
compelling characters, that of Lucy in his 1999 novel, Disgrace.   
Similar to Schreiner, Coetzee is a famed and widely read author in contemporary times.  
He received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2003 and is the author of many fiction and 
nonfiction books and is the first author to win the Booker Prize twice, once for Life & Times of 
Michael K (1983) and once for Disgrace (1999) (Poyner, 2009).  Like Schreiner, Coetzee is 
alternately praised for being “acutely aware that he speaks from a position of beneficiary of the 
apartheid regime, palpable in the string of anxious intellectuals that populate his novels” and 
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criticized for his work being “illustrative of racism in the media” by the African National 
Congress (p.11 & 1).    
Coetzee’s novel Disgrace (1999) tells the story of David Lurie, a white South African 
middle-aged modern languages professor at a university in Cape Town.  The historical time 
period is recognizably that of post-apartheid South Africa, a time in which white South Africans 
like Lurie are forced to confront drastic political changes and a new enforced sense of conflicted 
identity.  Lurie is particularly challenged by the fact that, in the new South Africa, he is forced to 
accept new boundaries, but “the boundary he finds it most difficult to accept is the one posited 
by others—mainly women and non-whites” (Azoulay, 2002, p. 33).  After being rejected by a 
“colored” woman who he employs via an escort service, David Lurie approaches one of his 
young students, Melanie Isaacs, also a “colored” woman, and proposes that they engage in an 
affair.  
She does not resist.  All she does is avert herself: avert her lips, avert her eyes… 
Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core.  As though she 
had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of 
the fox close on its neck.  So that everything done to her might be done, as it were, far 
away.  (Coetzee, p.25) 
 
While Lurie ponders Melanie’s reaction to his privileged assertion of his position of 
power as a white, older, man, Melanie files a complaint with the university and Lurie is 
summarily fired.  Of significance is that David Lurie does not resist accusations of his 
scandalous disgraceful behavior.  Instead he reports that all her claims are true.  He rejects his 
colleagues’ pleas for him to behave more prudently.  In this sense, Lurie demonstrates his 
challenge to the TRC-esque university committee.  He “refuses to turn his own passions into part 
of a utilitarian discourse of conveying messages, regrets, prohibitions and so on”  (Azoulay, p. 
36).  As a consequence, Lurie loses his job, his friends and his income, but interestingly, he sets 
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the terms. He outright refuses to elaborate on his story, stating simply, “I make no confession.  I 
put forward a plea, as is my right.  Guilty as charged.  That is my plea.  That is as far as I am 
prepared to go”  (Coetzee, p. 51). 
After accepting his punishment, he travels to his daughter, Lucy, who is living on a rural 
homestead farming land jointly owned by herself and an older black man named Petrus.  Lurie, 
in remarking on his daughter’s current lifestyle, describes his lesbian daughter as “a throwback” 
and a “frontier farmer of the new breed,” thus evoking a connection to a previous time in which 
farming was an assumed way of life for white South Africans (Coetzee, 61).  His daughter, in 
other words, is pursuing a dream life that is recognizable to Lurie, not because it is similar to his 
upbringing but rather because it is evocative of his ancestor’s idealized lifestyle.  He ponders this 
after arriving at the farm, “perhaps it was not [her parents] who produced her:  perhaps history 
had the larger share . . . Perhaps history had learned a lesson”  (Coetzee, 61-2). 
Lucy embraces this pastoral life of her white ancestors, but, somewhat like Olive 
Schreiner, she rejects the “mastering of the land that is the primal stuff of the Afrikaner 
plaasroman or ‘farm novel’ (Poyner, 157).  For example, the land had, for a time, been farmed by 
a group of progressive minded communal-living South Africans, including Lucy’s ex-partner, a 
woman.  Additionally, unlike her ancestors, she shares rights to land with Petrus, a black South 
African man.   
While Lurie sorts through the emotional and financial wreckage of his life and is cared 
for by his daughter, the central violent event of the novel occurs.  On a seemingly unremarkable 
and relaxed afternoon, as Lurie and his daughter are remarking upon the rescue dogs whom she 
rehabilitates, three young black boys/men arrive on the homestead and request to use the 
telephone. What follows is a depiction of a brutal siege in which Lurie is locked in the bathroom 
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and set on fire (he puts the fire out in the toilet bowl and sustains serious burns) while Lucy is 
raped by all three young men.   
It was history speaking through them. . .A history of wrong. . It may have seemed 
 personal, but it wasn’t.  It came down from the ancestors . . booty, war reparations; 
 another incident in the great campaign of redistribution. (Coetzee, 156 &176) 
Following this dramatic event, the second half of the novel is a depiction of the ways in 
which Lucy and Lurie, in very different ways, come to terms with the attack.  Their collective 
understanding of the act as a result of the intergenerational transmission of trauma evokes what 
Ariella Azoulay aptly describes in her analysis of the novel as “redistribution—which is the 
organizing principle of the novel—is performed countless times from countless points of view”  
(p. 37).  Lucy, who becomes pregnant as a result of the rapes (and choses to keep the baby), 
justifies the violent act as a form of redistribution of power.  She relates to her trauma as a form 
of deserved revenge.  And Lurie must see his own invasive behavior with Melanie played out 
with his own daughter, Lucy, before he can experience the depth of his own complicity in 
legacies of violence. 
In a statement that connects Olive Schreiner to the body of Lucy, Lucy asserts that her 
rape is “the price one has to pay for staying on. . .They see me as owing something.  They see 
themselves as debt collectors, tax collectors”  (Coetzee, p. 158).  Lucy also situates this 
retribution not in the form of land, but also as punishment via her body.  Her payment for being 
permitted access to land is her rape, her silence around her rape, it is “not her story to spread but 
theirs:  they are its owners [;] how they put her in her place, how they showed her what a woman 
was for” (Coetzee, p. 115).  So again, like Olive, even the very attempts to resist racist discourses 
requires something of her as a woman.  For Lucy, rape signifies a leveler of racial injustice that 
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can be traced directly back to the land”  (Poyner, 159).  Towards the end of the novel, Lurie 
speaks to his daughter Lucy (who is pregnant and engaged to Petrus as a form of “historical 
reconciliation”) claiming, “you wish to humble yourself before history” (Poyner, 159 & Coetzee, 
p. 160).  
Lurie in two instances, during his own “trial” for his “disgrace” and in positioning blacks 
as “raping” the land/his daughter, flips stereotypes on their heads suggesting the improbability of 
any easy and lasting redemption for anyone, given the legacies of history/colonialism.  In some 
ways Coetzee implies that, while devastating, black South Africans do have the right, the 
entitlement to anger a need for retribution.  What he may be suggesting though, in Disgrace, is 
that there is no authentically truthful or nonviolent means by which to atone for or be redeemed 
by history in South Africa.  In other words, no act is sustainably reparative because what he and 
all the characters in Disgrace are contending with is too big and violent to be circumvented with 
words or actions.  Coetzee then is possibly writing, as Chapman (1996) suggests, in Lacanian 
allegory, “read[ing] into the lies, silences and slippages of what has been repressed in histories 
that are assumed to be authoritative” (p389).  His depiction of Lurie’s blindness, of his caustic 
and entitled sense of reparation as a white man, is Coetzee forcing the readers to undergo the 
very torment of wrestling with the endless nuanced questions surrounding the question of how 
one is to live with guilt, shame and legacies of violence.  He seems to be attempting to assert the 
fact that collective trauma has and is occurring in South Africa.  That bodies and souls are 
impacted, that no one escapes. Chapman goes on to warn however, that even this exploding open 
of possible unacknowledged, repressed or nuanced understandings of the legacy of imperialism 
is “an endless deferral of moral consequence which, in the agonized society, can merely provoke 
41 
 
the impatience of those for whom reality is less an elusive signifier, more a crack on the head by 
a police truncheon”  (Chapman, p.389). 
It leaves me to wonder, however, about whether or not Lucy must pay for Olive’s 
expansive views?  Must someone be punished for the momentary bliss that Schreiner 
experienced via the South African landscape? Furthermore, in what specific ways does the 
body’s pain spell out the inheritance of shame and disgrace—the alexithymic aspects of the 
white South African female experience?  
Theory one 
In the next section, I will discuss feminist theory and its usefulness in exploring my 
phenomenon.  Feminist theory has provided a lens through which I can consider an 
understanding of the emotional experience of the individual as valuable and intrinsically 
connected to the transformation of oppressive social structures.  Nuanced explorations of gender, 
sexuality, desire, power and the body are essential to my analysis of Olive Schreiner and 
Coetzee’s Lucy.  In order to connect the experiences of these women over time and to fully 
elaborate on the transformative power of their somatic experience, I engaged with a feminist 
theoretical framework.  I hope to demonstrate, in the following chapters, the way in which 
feminist and relational theories have assisted me in elevating Schreiner and Lucy's personal and 













To outline the history of feminism in the West would exceed the bounds of this thesis 
project. Furthermore, to attempt a summary of all feminist theories that informed my project 
would produce an excessively expansive document.  In this chapter I begin with a brief 
introduction of the relevance of feminist theory to my thesis project in order to explain why and 
how I chose to employ this multifaceted body of theory to explicate my identified phenomenon.  
I then examine the relevance of four feminist theorists to my specific project.  
 My discussion of feminism will be limited to theorists situated in Western feminist 
discourse.  In so doing, I am aware that entire discourses around transnational feminism, “third 
world” feminism and others are notably missing. In order to maintain the common thread of 
psychodynamic psychoanalytic theory as the underlying theoretical structure of this project, I 
made the conscious choice to focus on Western theories that more explicitly engage with the 
legacy of psychoanalytic scholarship.  This strategic move, however, limits my discussion 
substantially.   
An engagement with transnational feminist psychology, with its explicit focus on the 
impact of legacies of colonialism, globalization, racism and other systems of regulatory 
dominance in the non-Western world, might have substantiated my intent to connect legacies of 
trauma, colonial violence and contemporary white South African psychic and somatic distress 
(Desai, 2007 & Grabe, S., & Else-Quest, N., 2012).  In fact, transnational feminists argue 
43 
 
compellingly "theorizing can only be useful if it can provide criteria for change and modes of 
resistance that are not mere reflections of the situation and values of the theorizer" (Grabe, S., & 
Else-Quest, N., p.160).  While I do not intend to impose oppressive and dominant Western 
values on a non-Western context such as South Africa, I am of the belief that transparency is 
important and I also believe that I cannot claim a positionality I do not inhabit.  I am deeply 
influenced by the work of Western psychoanalysts and feminists, and I ascribe to a belief that 
some of this theory is relevant to an examination of the complexity of theorizing the impact of 
Western colonization of South Africa and the ensuing legacy of collective trauma and violence.  
I also hope that this project outlines the transnational implications of exploring somatic 
symptomology, collective trauma and the gendered body.      
 Western Feminism as a political movement took shape over the course of the 20th century 
as a means of addressing inequalities in the treatment of women in areas such as education, 
employment, government, political authority, financial independence and sexual pleasure.  
Feminists identified the complex ways in which patriarchal power structures impact the 
foundational organizing principles of nearly every aspect of society, including interpersonal 
relationships.   
We had learned through the women’s movement that our internal and external existence 
were entwined, that the outside world was inside us and that we needed to struggle on all 
fronts to produce social change. (Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1982, p.7) 
 Of particular relevance to my project are the historical roots of feminism’s impact on 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.  In their book, Outside in..Inside Out (1982), Eichenbaum 
and Orbach trace this impact and assert that it is precisely in discourses of the Women’s 
Liberation Movement that feminist psychoanalysis came into a confrontation with the political 
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relevance of exploring the interpersonal and intrapersonal experiences of women.  Given this 
frame, the authors argue that consciousness raising groups allowed several key insights: 1) 
through listening to an individual’s experience a much more complex understanding of how 
society is structured became possible; 2) discussions of sexual politics “enlarged and challenged” 
previously held understandings of how social/economic/political forces were structured in ways 
to maintain the marginalization of oppressed groups such as women and 3) the complex 
emotional life of women was given a space for exploration and this led to discussions around 
sexuality, women’s relationships to their bodies and exploration of previously taboo emotional 
content (p.12).   
 Individuals involved in both feminism and psychoanalysis began to elaborate on the 
parallel process of these two theoretical structures by highlighting the ways that both 
perspectives value the emotional experience of the individual as a means of transforming the 
quality of life of the individual in society.  What remained was a concern on the part of many 
feminists about the relevance of psychoanalysis to the feminist movement.  This tension exists 
today, but many contemporary psychoanalytic feminists have followed in the footsteps of early 
Freudian-influenced psychoanalytic feminists such as Karen Horney (1885-1952) and later Clara 
Thompson (1893-1958) who prioritized the social and cultural experiences of women while 
maintaining a relationship to traditional analytic frameworks (Shapiro, 2002).  A more 
contemporary feminist psychoanalyst, Nancy J. Chodorow (1989), further asserts the value and 
relevance of feminist influenced psychoanalysis stating,  
Supported by the feminist claim that the personal is political, I turned to 
psychoanalysis as a basis for feminist theory.  I argued that the centrality of sex and 
gender in the categories of psychoanalysis, coupled with the tenacity, emotional 
centrality and sweeping power in our lives of our sense of gendered self, made 
psychoanalysis a particularly apposite source of feminist theorizing. In my current view, 
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feminist understanding requires a multiplex account. . .of the dynamics of gender, 
sexuality, sexual inequality and domination. (p.1-2 & 5) 
 
My thesis project is strongly informed by Chodorow's formulation.  In my project I 
utilize a feminist framework to explore the significance of women’s subjectivity, voice, power 
and desire expressed via the body in the hopes of demonstrating why women’s bodies/gender 
need to be asserted and valued in their complexity.  I engage with contemporary feminist 
theorists Judith Butler and Esther Rashkin to achieve this goal.  Additionally, I incorporate the 
work of two feminist theorists whose projects focus specifically on feminist understandings of 
the white South African woman’s experience—Susan Horton and Georgina Horrell.  These 
contemporary feminist frameworks provide a lens for my exploration of white South African 
female subjectivity in the work of Coetzee and Schreiner. 
Judith Butler (Subjects, Gender and Resistance) 
To problematize the matter of bodies may entail an initial loss of epistemological certainty. . . 
such a loss may well indicate a significant and promising shift in political thinking. This 
unsettling of ʻmatterʼ can be understood as initiating new possibilities, new ways for bodies to 
matter. (Butler, 1993; 30) 
I chose to limit my discussion here to Judith Butlerʼs 1993 book, Bodies that matter: On 
the discursive limits of ʻSexʼ because it encapsulates the complexity of the feminist body-- a 
body inscribed with and by cultural influences, a body that is not solely biologically determined, 
a body that can function as a site of resistance.  In order to get to the resistance however, it is 
important to outline Butler’s understanding of subjection and gender.   
 Judith Butler challenges some of the fundamental claims of first wave feminism.  As 
opposed to feminists who believe that the category of woman is a biologically determined one, 
Butler argues (à la Michel Foucault, History of sexuality: An introduction ([1976] 1990)) that all 
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identities are informed by the “techniques and structures of subjectivity” often referred to as “the 
process of subjection”  (Brady & Schirato, 2010, p. 6).  In this sense, in order to be a subject, one 
must be able to be recognizable to the dominant cultural understandings of subjecthood in any 
given moment.  The body therefore, takes on the content, the meanings, inscribed by these 
dominant cultural designations and narratives.  This body, forced to comply with the process of 
subjection, “live[s] within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered schemas”  
(Butler, xi).  This regulated body is also only knowable to the extent it is able to meet the criteria 
of any given normative culture.  For instance, as a person categorized as a female, my options 
and desires are routed in particular directions.   
 However, what sets Butler apart from Foucault’s ideas around regulation, discipline and 
subjegation (History of sexuality: An introduction ([1976] 1990)) is her consideration of the 
psyche.  In her engagement with psychoanalytic concepts of attachment to the primary caregiver, 
the incest taboo and many others, Butler devises a means of exploring the dialectics of subjection 
in such a way that illuminates both the ways that subjection of bodies limits and disciplines as 
well as the ways that regulatory power and its limits operate to generate desire.    
 Much like Butler’s dialectical understanding of the concept of subjection, her approach to 
gender is complex.  Butler’s challenge to conventional ideas of the importance of representation 
as a primary goal of feminism comes in the form of bringing the dialectics of subjection to bear 
on the construction of gender.  In this way, the perceived coherence of gendered bodies is a 
socially constructed notion.  What, then, does it mean, for feminists to fight for more 
representation of women in various areas of cultural life/production?  In essence, what Butler 
and Chodorow (quoted earlier) assert is a need to burst open categories of male and female, 
straight and gay, and normative and non-normative in an effort to even begin to comprehend the 
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complex, historically influenced and socially constructed gendered body.  And, as Eichenbaum 
& Orbach (1982) suggest, in this bursting open, what many feminists found, much like Butler, is 
that “the outside world was inside us” (p.7).  Therefore, the ‘matter’ of gendered bodies then, is a 
matter of the constitutive parts of the ‘world’ outside the body.  For Butler, the body is the 
product of both language and materiality: language and materiality are not opposed, for language 
both is and refers to that which is material, and what is material never fully escapes from the 
process by which it is signified (p. 68). 
 What better guidepost than Butler in an exploration of literary instances where the 
“weight of social expectations expresses itself symptomatically,” and where the body becomes 
“a site of battle expressing ambivalence towards heteronormative demands. . .on strike against 
[her] surroundings, unable to comply with what is expected of [her]?” (Lang, n.d., p. iii). It is 
precisely in my exploration of somatic preoccupation and distress in literature that I have been 
able to trace the “inexpressible protest against oppressive structures” such as colonialism/ 
apartheid, heterosexism, sexism and racism (Lang, p.iii). It is the linguistic portrayal of the 
distressed body that meets Butler in her “loss of epistemological certainty” (Butler, 30). Often 
the words themselves fail, but the literary portrayal, the reading of the words (and the ways that 
this reading is influenced by the readers' own positionality and fantasy life) draws out the 
potentiality of the not-quite-sick, the not-quite-well, the unsettled bodies of Lucy and Olive. 
These bodies are able to demonstrate, more powerfully than words, the violent, indigestible and 
unincorporatable aspects of these women’s experiences. 
 One way to read their “sickness” through the lens of potentiality that Butler provides is to 
locate it as a body in resistance, a body whose subjectivity as a white woman in South Africa 
possesses diminished cultural and political agency.  Therefore, the body resists. It illuminates the 
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subjectivity of a white South African woman who wrestles with rampant racism and sexism in 
her surroundings.  Very little is permissible about this perspective. Coming directly from the 
mouths of these white women (both Lucy and Olive are unafraid to voice their subversive 
views), resistance lands flat, is diminished.  However, when Lucy and Olive’s bodies are 
engaged in protest, in revolt, notice is taken. 
 To take notice, as I have, is to engage in a reading of the corporeal textualities evoked in 
Disgrace and Olive’s published letters.  Two feminist theorists who have also taken notice are 
Susan R. Horton and Georgina Horrell, South African literary scholars.  Horton, a scholar of 
Olive Schreiner and Horrell, who has published extensively on Disgrace, both share a 
commitment to a deep and thorough exploration of Olive's and Lucy’s experiences as gendered 
white South Africans whose bodies are deeply impacted by historical legacies, their current 
regulatory cultural norms and their struggles to be recognized in all their complexity. 
Susan R. Horton and Georgina Horrell 
 Susan Horton, an associate professor of English at the University of Massachusetts, is 
very clear about the ways in which her, Difficult women, artful lives: Olive Schreiner and Isak 
Dinesen, In and Out of Africa (1995), is a feminist intervention.  In turning her attention to the 
subjectivity of two white South African women--Isak Dinesen, author of Out of Africa (1937) 
and Olive Schreiner-- Horton engages in biographical references, Schreiner's personal letters as 
well as content from her novels to critically engage around her topic of interest, a self-
proclaimed “modest project of reification” (p. xxii). Horton “speculate[s] only on what two 
particular white women, got out of their particular encounters in Africa; to consider the part 
Africans played in each woman’s psychic economy” (p. xxii).  While perhaps “modest” and 
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more in line with conventional feminist writings, Horton manages to illuminate overlooked and 
deeply personal dimensions of Schreiner’s psychic life.   
 In order to accomplish her task, Horton begins from a rather simple but profound starting 
point.  She asserts that the experiences of white women who lived during colonial times in South 
Africa matter.  Considering that her book was published only a year after the official end of 
apartheid, Horton’s “modest” feminist project necessarily takes on the weight of political 
maneuver, much in the tradition of nearly all feminist writing and theorizing.  Like a question I 
posed in my methodology section (why white South African women and what is significant 
about their subjective experiences?), Horton tackles this understandable query rather obliquely.  
In her conclusion she claims that after much internal exploration about her investment in the 
experiences of these women, her book was an attempt to study the “literary practices” of 
Schreiner and Dinesen.  She clarifies: 
A study of literary practices, then-- which I’ve construed here to include the way 
we comb our hair and position our bodies in the landscape as well as how we write our 
novels--can take us far toward identifying then tapping into the charge certain writings 
and writers have for us; far toward bringing those ideological contradictions into the 
foreground and our Western, white and/or female selves into the light we’ve feared.  
(p.242) 
 
While never fully acknowledging the contemporary political circumstances in which she 
is writing, Horton remarks that her intervention (her almost obsessive focus on the details, the 
words, the traces, of the subjective experience of Dinesen and Schreiner) is ultimately meant to 
remind us as Western readers, not to forget.  Instead of attempting, as a Western critic, to “posit 
real Africans to counter earlier misconstructions,” Horton chooses then to ask of white folks who 
“produce those aberrant identities….How did the distortions come to be and what needs do they 
serve?”  (p.245).  Her answer, unsurprisingly, and similar to mine, is that colonialism and 
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imperialism, violence and racism in the European encounter with Africa, functioned to fulfill a 
lack, a desire, in the individual and collective psyches of white Europeans.  In order to avert a 
repetition of the past we as white Europeans and European Americans must not make vows to 
never inflict violence again, but instead must return and remember the deficits, the legacies of 
trauma, which produced the very circumstances for the violence and redemptiveness of the 
colonial encounter.   
 That women’s bodies are, in times of social conflict and disjuncture, sites of struggle or 
 pages upon which the narrative of guilt may be written and the promise of reparation 
 etched, should not be passed over without critical comment.  (Horrell, 2008, p.30) 
   Another feminist theorist who, like Horton, is working intimately at the intersection of 
literature, gender studies, whiteness studies, psychology and philosophy is Georgina Horrell.  A 
professor at Cambridge University and working primarily on notions of guilt and whiteness in 
South African postcolonial writing, Horrell has written extensively about Coetzee’s novel 
Disgrace (1999).  Her particular interests are in tandem with my own and her feminist writing 
about this novel focuses much attention on the figure of the white daughter of the central 
character in the novel, Lucy.  Horrell’s intervention in the extensive theoretical writing about 
Disgrace is evocative of Butler in that, her reading of the novel, and Lucy’s body and 
subjectivity in particular, become the central focus, thus debunking the idea of a naturalized and 
blank white South African female subjectivity.  The “violent inscription” of Lucy’s body and its 
multifaceted meanings is interpreted through a lens influenced by Butler, Foucault and Nietzsche  
(Horrell, 2008, p.19).  The relevance of feminist theory in Horrell’s writing on Disgrace lies, 
much like the work of Horton, in the persistence of training the reader’s gaze onto the broader 
social implications of the pain, experience and oppression of an individual woman.   
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 In her article “Postcolonial Disgrace: (White) women and (White) guilt in the “New” 
South Africa (2008), published 14 years after the official end of apartheid, Horrell makes a 
compelling argument for reading the “marks and ciphers” of Lucy’s body as “indelibly etched 
textually with guilt” (p.18).   Horrell positions a read of these “marks and ciphers” as significant 
and diagnostic in regards to the “effecting of reparation” in contemporary South Africa (p.18).  
Conveyed more forcefully, Horrell asserts, “it is on and through the body of Lurie’s daughter 
that the terms for white South Africa’s future ‘remembering’ are ultimately sketched”  (p.19).   
 To support this assertion and her reading of Disgrace from the point of view of Lucy as 
opposed to her father, Horrell turns to Nietzsche (On the genealogy of morals/Ecce Homo, 
Vintage Books, 1969) and Foucault (History of sexuality: An introduction ([1976] 1990)) and 
their philosophical musings on pain and punishment.  While not specifically referencing the 
subjected female body, Nietzsche argued “if something is to be remembered, it must be burnt in:  
only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”  (Nietzsche, 1969, p. 61).  Through 
Nietzsche, Horrell engages in a reading of Lucy’s rape and its subsequent somatic implications 
as evidence of the dialectics of guilt and punishment in the contemporary South African psyche.  
Furthermore, Horrell surmises, “for what must not be forgotten a corporeal note shall be made, 
so that even in the case of seeming bankruptcy, the debt is still retrievable from the body of the 
debtor”  (p.19).  Lucy’s white female body then, violated by black men in a brutal gang rape 
resulting in a pregnancy, becomes the “corporeal note,” a reminder that even in harsh economic 
times for this farmer, a debt reflecting the violence of her white ancestors must be collected. 
 Much like Foucault, Nietzsche and Horrell argue that there is significance to the debtor-
creditor formulation as it illuminates a social order built on legacies of trauma and a related 
requisite punishment.  In contemporary South Africa and in Disgrace, these themes are 
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substantially evidenced, perhaps even more so than the lofty ethics of forgiveness and 
transcendence promoted by proponents of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  Some 
authors (Lebdai, B., 2008) however, side with the loftier ethics, reading the Lucy character as a 
“paradigm of hope” potentially reflecting a body terribly punished but also one willing to 
confront and accept “serenely” a new historical reality (of blacks and whites sharing power) 
(p.35 &36). Lucy, after all, choses to keep the baby after being impregnated by rape.  Lebdai 
argues that this choice “enables the narrative to convey forgiveness and reconciliation” (p.37).  
In contrast, Horrell suggests a slightly different read, and one that does not reflect the 
contemporary narrative embodied by the TRC-inspired Rainbow Nation of the New South 
Africa.   
 Instead, Horrell insists on a discourse of remembering.  She reads the rape as exploding 
open the depth of psyche wounding enacted by legacies of colonialism and apartheid rule, 
reminding the white body that moving forward with a serene and forgiving attitude cannot erase 
these legacies.  If taken as a parable, Disgrace, via Horrell, becomes a tale of the wounded 
collective unconscious of black and white South Africa, a country in which violence abounds, 
debts are collected and history cannot be rewritten cleanly.  To put it more clearly, Disgrace is, 
for Horrell “white postcolonial writing that is attempting to negotiate the existential terms for a 
humiliating present and a dark, disrupted future”  (p.30). 
  Horrell’s investigation concerning Lucy’s body returns again and again to the way that 
the young, white, female body spells out the terms of reconciliation in the New South Africa.  
Lucy demonstrates an awareness and acceptance of the historical wounds that inform her current 
occupation of the plot of South African land she is farming and she understands that there is a 
“price to pay for staying on”  (Coetzee, p. 158).   
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 ‘How humiliating,’ he says finally.  ‘Such high hopes, and to end like this.’ 
 Yes, I agree, it is humiliating.  But perhaps that is a good point to start from again.  
 Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept.  To start at ground level.  With nothing. No 
 cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.’ 
 ‘Like a dog.’ 
 ‘Yes, like a dog.”  (Coetzee, p. 205)  
 Ultimately, there is the disgrace, and so much of it.  To whom does it belong and who 
will take on the burden of responsibility?  And what is the price that is paid when a white South 
African refuses to disavow the past?  The humiliation of the legacies of violence enacted by her 
white ancestors, at the close of the novel, appears to rest solely on the willing corporeal being of 
Lucy. She keeps the baby, she consents to be Petrus’s (her co-farmer and a black South African) 
third wife in order to ensure his protection of her on the land and in so doing gives up all legal 
rights to the property.  She accepts the humiliation as deserved, as what is required, to occupy 
space as a white person in the New South Africa.  Coetzee’s novel, as evidenced in a final 
exchange between Lucy and her father (cited above), reminds us as readers just how terribly 
much of the body, mind and spirit must be compromised in order for a white female body to 
remain safe and unthreatened in rural South Africa.  Lucy’s white gendered body, as Horrell 
argues, is ultimately a “reparational cipher” that must be engaged when repentant words uttered 
during and after the TRC have failed so painfully in their insufficiency to mediate the legacies of 
violence enacted by white invaders (p. 29). 
Esther Rashkin 
If there is a lesson in the broad shape of the circulation of cultures, it is surely that we are all 
already contaminated by each other. 
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-Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House 
 Much like Horton and Horrell, Rashkin proposes a question with a complex answer--- 
What are the cryptic narratives that go unconsidered in contemporary cultural criticism? 
Furthermore, what is the impact of repressed trauma on cultural production and/or the individual 
psyche?  In their questioning, their reframing, Horton and Horrell were able to reframe the 
narrative of a white European encountering a black African and vice versa.  They were able, 
through a lively and nuanced account of the experiences of Schreiner and Lucy, to speak to what 
these women might have needed from Africa and how they were impacted by these desires.  
Similarly, Rashkin poses questions about the mechanics of transmission of trauma and part of 
her answer resides in a reworking of the limiting discourses concerning trauma, suffering and 
repression.  Rashkin’s theorizing around the notion of intergenerational transmission of trauma, 
and in particular, the haunted psyche, is precisely what Horrell discusses in her exploration of the 
ways in which Lucy’s body is necessarily inscribed with legacies of guilt and shame (“marks and 
ciphers”) as a result of the violence enacted by her white imperialist ancestors (Horrell, p.18). 
 The “marks and ciphers” to which Horrell refers are evocative of the themes outlined in 
Esther Rashkin’s 1999 essay published in the Psychoanalytic Review, “The haunted child: Social 
catastrophe, phantom transmissions and the aftermath of collective trauma” and her more recent 
book, Unspeakable secrets and the psychoanalysis of culture (2008).   While briefly described in 
the Methods section of this thesis, in this section I aim to more fully explain the relevance of 
Rashkin’s theories regarding the integration of psychoanalysis, feminism and cultural criticism to 
my own project.  While not explicitly identified with a feminist project, I argue that the nature of 
Rashkin’s engagement with psychoanalysis and cultural production reflects the ethics of 
contemporary psychoanalytic feminists, in particular a rigorous commitment to expose the 
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radical political potential revealed through an exploration of the depth of individual and 
collective psychic experience.  Her staunch insistence on the relevance of what falls outside of a 
text (phantom narratives) to culture—what she terms “encrypted links”—is precisely what 
feminist theory is striving to identify (Rashkin, 2008, p. 17).  The concealment of what does not 
serve the heteronormative, white, sexist cultural critic or analyst does not, as Rashkin argues, 
make this repressed content vanish.  Traces of disavowal remain.     
Too shameful to be put into words or integrated within the parent’s ego, yet too 
central to the parent’s experience to be expelled or foreclosed, the drama is buried alive, 
along with the shame attached to it, and transmitted in encrypted form into the child’s 
unconscious.   (Rashkin, 1999, p. 443) 
 
 Rashkin is a theorist of the unspoken.  She is an analyst and academic who works not 
only with the unconscious of her clients, but also with the unassimilated trauma of her client’s 
ancestors.  Rashkin argues that this unspoken trauma, when disavowed or intolerable, is 
transmitted to the next generation via a mechanism of “transgenerational haunting” (Rashkin, 
1999, p. 447).  Inheritors of this trauma often experience psychic distress in the form of anxiety, 
depression, psychosomatic illness, isolative behaviors, fears of persecution and feelings of panic 
and impotence.  The inheritors to which Rashkin refers, are frequently charged unconsciously 
with expressing the affect that a parent “attached to an event about which [he or she] was unable 
to speak”  (p. 444).  In many cases of these phantom transmissions, the unspeakable affect 
contained in the secret is in the realm of guilt or shame.   
 For Rashkin, much of her work is influenced by clinical encounters with children of 
Holocaust survivors.  In this sense, the inheritors, within whom an “intrapsychic bequest capable 
of significant behavioral and affective disruption” is lodged, are plagued by the knowledge of 
having survived the collective trauma that their parents endured (p.444).  The impact of being 
forced unconsciously to manage and make sense of symptoms related to the unassimilated 
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trauma of one’s ancestors is substantial.  As a result, Rashkin asserts that an analyst must engage 
with symptoms that “narrate in ciphered form” such as reading a child’s anorexia as “something 
[that] was taken into the mouth that must never leave the mouth or be uttered; that the mouth 
must be kept closed about the shame the mother ‘swallowed’ and silenced”  (p. 445).  In the 
course of working with this type of symptom, Rashkin realized that, along with phantom 
recognition, the work of an analyst is also one of helping a client “rejoin with its absent 
narrative-complement or intertext, which lies silenced beyond the child”  (p.445).               
 What are the narratives beyond perception or experience that influence the two inheritors 
with whom this project is concerned?  In my own work with the characters of Lucy and Olive I 
have attempted, much like Rashkin’s analyst, to make contact with the collective “ancestor who 
concealed the secret”  (p.445).  In other words, the collective ancestor, the white colonial and 
imperialist South Africans, must be “raised from the dead so that [his or her] secret can be safely 
brought out in the open” (p.445).  In my reading of the narratives of Lucy and Olive I do not, 
much like Rashkin, identify the “secret” as something consciously hidden, but rather as a series 
of shameful violations and guilty complicities that were likely part of the unconscious of many 
of Lucy and Olive’s ancestors, parents included.   
 Rashkin advocates for a form of analyzing the deceased and the resonance of this activity 
for my project regarding intergenerational transmission of trauma is substantial.  In focusing my 
reading of the cryptic symptoms on the bodies of Lucy and Olive, I have attempted, influenced 
by Rashkin, to evaluate the possibility of “helping to rid the haunted subject of something that 
does not belong to her”  (p.  445).  In other words, it is possible that the somatic symptom, a 
“narrative in ciphered form,” does not come about as a result of repression of psychic distress in 
an individual (p. 445).  Rather, Rashkin’s theorizing would indicate that the phantom narrative is 
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precisely the collectively disavowed shame and guilt of white colonial and apartheid-era South 
Africans.  This disavowed narrative is embedded as an intrapsychic bequest in the bodies and 
spirits of Olive and Lucy, demanding attention and threatening to expose the collectively 
repressed violence and shame of generations of white South Africans.   
 Much like Olive and Lucy’s ancestors, contemporary readers, scholars and clinicians 
cannot metabolize the potentially physically and psychically destabilizing content of certain 
events or dramas of the colonial encounter or apartheid rule.  The result of this (often collective) 
unconscious disavowal is a resting of the “shameful, humiliating and thus potentially 
annihilating” content, “enveloped in silence” in the unconscious of an inheritor like Olive or 
Lucy (Rashkin, 2008, p. 15).  Somatic distress, contained and often unexplainable or 
inexpressible pain (often deemed non-existent, unwarranted or hyperchondriacal), is one 
manifestation of the disorienting and profound impact of the transmission of unassimilatable 
trauma from one generation to the next.  It is my hope that the various feminist theories I have 
explored make sense of how and why the particular bodies of white South African women such 
as Lucy and Olive are the repositories of this collective psychic pain and disavowal.   
Conclusion  
Misogynist thought has commonly found a convenient self-justification for women’s secondary 
social positions by containing them within bodies that are represented, even constructed, as frail, 
imperfect, unruly, and unreliable, subject to various intrusions which are not under conscious 
control.  (Grosz, 1994, p.13, emphasis mine) 
In his well-regarded book (Only an Anguish to Live Here: Olive Schreiner and the Anglo-
Boer War, 1899-1902 (1992)), Karel Schoeman, often cited as the leading South African scholar 
on Olive Schreiner’s life, frequently embodies the particular “misogynist” position Grosz 
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describes.  In Only an anguish, Schoeman (1992) describes Olive Schreiner as; a “passionate, 
gifted and deeply committed woman living within constraints and in a climate of violence which 
she was unable to influence,” an “impetuous, emotional, over-excitable and completely 
impractical” and a “hopeless invalid who suffered from a heart condition and crippling attacks of 
asthma  (p. 7, 15 & 31).  These descriptions are interspersed with narratives about the extent to 
which Schreiner was impacted by the landscape in South Africa--- something Schoeman 
ultimately attributes to a sort of psychological vulnerability and a possible indication of her 
receptivity to the intrusions of the unforgiving South African land.  Schoeman’s portrait of 
Schreiner as a woman who sought out beautiful yet barren landscapes and who engaged 
impractically in anti-racist and anti-imperialist struggles marks Schreiner as nearly deserving of 
her somatic distress.  In a particularly poignant passage, Schoeman details the events of 
surrounding Schreiner’s miscarriage: 
In August 1899 Olive Schreiner, who was then living in Johannesburg with her 
husband Cron, had a miscarriage.  At the same time, she began to suffer a severe attack of 
asthma, brought on by the weather, which in turn developed into bronchitis, and was so 
ill that her doctor insisted on her leaving the town.  [At the time], Johannesburg was 
preparing for war.  The Cronwright-Schreiner’s wished to be in the Transvaal, where 
their sympathies lay, but Olive’s rapidly deteriorating condition gave her little choice. 
(p.11) 
 
 Schoeman’s unchallenged misogyny underscores my commitment to engaging in 
feminist theory in this project as a means to experience Schreiner in a more nuanced light.  He 
pays no mind to the impact of violence (racism, sexism, heterosexism, imperialism), the 
historical legacy of violence Schreiner inherited or the correlation between the miscarriage (her 
first pregnancy ended in the death of her newborn and three subsequent miscarriages before this 
final fourth) and Schreiner’s physical “deterioration.”  In so doing he positions her as a woman 
incapable of subjection and his solution is to blame Schreiner’s physical and emotional distress 
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on her wild and non-normative identity--- a position that Schoeman very nearly believes merits 
the punishment of sickness for its excessiveness and willfulness when embodied by a woman.  In 
his final analysis of Olive, Schoeman bluntly summarizes,  
throughout her life she retreated consciously or unconsciously into physical 
incapacity in order to avoid responsibility and escape situations with which she could not 
cope. . . her apparent failure to realize her full potential would seem to be due to factors 
such as her odd, undisciplined childhood and beyond that to some fatal emotional flaw 
which doomed her to be always searching and striving, energetically but aimlessly, but 
with little tenacity. (p. 217) 
 
 For the purposes of this project, feminist theory has provided a multitude of lenses for 
understanding the somatic distress of Schreiner and Lucy (to be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6), all of which enable this distress to speak and have meaning beyond the dismissive 
quality of Schoeman’s normative gaze.  It is my hope that this project, especially given my 
discussion of Rashkin’s transgenerational transmission of trauma/haunting and Butler’s 
theoretical musings on subjection and gender, insubstantiates Schoeman’s attribution of a 
willfully reckless and nearly hypochondriacal character to Schreiner.  In the following chapter I 
engage in an exploration of Relational Theory and follow that with a discussion of my chosen 
theories’ bearing on my case material—all of which provide a significant variation on 















While one can argue that Relational and Intersubjective theories established themselves 
within the psychoanalytic community in the 1980’s, this argument omits the significant 
contribution made by Sandor Ferenczi to the development of mutual analysis (Aron, 1998).  
Lewis Aron, one of the preeminent practitioners and scholars of contemporary psychoanalysis, 
asserts that it is likely as a result of Ferenczi’s complex relationship with Sigmund Freud that 
Ferenczi’s substantial contributions have been overlooked.    
 In exploring Freud and Ferenczi’s relationship, one can get a sense of the conceptual 
distinctions that have come to define contemporary Relational theory.  Freud and Ferenczi had a 
close relationship.  Freud was analyst, mentor and hero to Ferenczi.  Ferenczi was analaysand, 
student and a significant provocateur.  In reading published correspondences between Freud and 
Ferenczi, Aron puts forth an argument for the relevance of Ferenczi’s provocations, especially in 
regards to Ferenczi’s desires for “emotional honesty, accessibility, directness, openness, 
spontaneity and disclosure of the person of the analyst” to be considered as beneficial 
dimensions of an analytic relationship (Aron, p. 15).  The fact that Ferenczi also longed for an 
apprehension of the relational ‘truth’ of his relationship with Freud, and Freud’s ultimate 
rejection of these desires, is one of the reasons that Frenczi’s thoughts on mutual analysis are 
relegated.  In other words, Freud characterized Ferenczi’s “desire for openness” and an analysis 
based on affective involvement of both parties as “essentially feminine” and an indicator of 
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Ferenczi’s “infantile sexuality, exhibitionism and voyeurism. . . and homosexual longing”  (p. 12 
& 17).  While frustrated by Freud’s personal rejection of Ferenczi’s efforts to establish intimacy 
in their relationship, Ferenczi maintained that his “longings for engagement and mutual openness 
were no more neurotic or pathological than were Freud’s needs for personal distance and 
authority”  (p. 18).   
 Ferenczi’s notions of bi-directionality and mutual influence have become the hallmarks 
of contemporary practices of Relationally-oriented psychoanalysis.  Freud’s critique of 
Ferenczi’s ideas remains alive in contemporary critiques of relational or intersubjective theory as 
“naive, rooted in the [analyst’s] own infantile neediness. . .and a denial of the power of universal 
themes of aggression”  (p. 17).  Despite these critiques, theorists such as Jessica Benjamin, Susie 
Orbach, Muriel Dimen, Lewis Aron and others continue to more fully develop nuanced theories 
regarding the practice of mutual analysis, thanks to the work and persistence of Ferenczi.     
 Relational theory began to significantly impact psychoanalytic practice and thinking in 
the 1980’s as a critique of existing psychoanalytic clinical theories.  Influenced by a focus on 
dialectics and a challenge to binaries, relational theory sought to blend existing theories with 
specific attention to our interaction with others.  Pioneers in this re-shaping of psychodynamic 
theory include Lewis Aron, Stephen Mitchell, Jessica Benjamin, Jay R. Greenberg and Sandor 
Ferenczi (in the 1930’s).  These theorists, in varying capacities, attempted to incorporate feminist 
theory, gender studies, contemporary cognitive science and neuroscience, infancy and 
attachment research, cultural theory and dialectical philosophy into a clinical approach that takes 
as its starting point the assumption that it is not drives, but rather relationship with others that 
influence our unconscious (Hadley, 2008).      
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 In clinical practice, relational theory emphasizes the self, other and space between them 
and as such, issues of countertransference and transference are expanded beyond the traditional 
psychoanalytic binary.  Of particular significance about the "relational turn" is the articulation of, 
what Jody Messler Davies (1996) calls the “relational unconscious”  (Hadley, 208 & Davis, 
p.562).  The transition from a theory of mind based on repression to an understanding of the 
unconscious using a dissociation-based model, a “multiply organized, associationally linked 
network of meaning attribution and understanding” (562).  This theory might suit Esther 
Rashkin, who, as I previously mentioned, also favored a theory of mind that allowed for a more 
nuanced understanding of the unconscious in regards to trauma, especially its impact and 
transmission.  Relational theory allows for multiple self-states, given this dissociation-based 
model, and therefore an issue such as somatic preoccupation becomes, “instead of a 
contradiction to be resolved…. perhaps the mind-body problem is a paradox to be explored”  
(Dimen, 2000, p.37).  In this sense, the hypochondriachal or somatically preoccupied body in the 
relationally oriented clinical encounter, becomes instead, bod(ies) in relationship with affective 
content shared between two unconsciouses.  In other words, the body of one is co-constructed in 
the clinical encounter and the body is, as Susie Orbach (2006) puts it, “affectively organized, 
rather than disorganized” (p. 6).        
 The relational turn is a helpful theoretical lens for exploring my relationship as a reader 
to the texts in which I have chosen to engage. This relational turn implies an assertion of the 
significance of the dyad and a move away from the discovery of the “truth” of intraspychic 
experience that is a hallmark of traditional psychoanalysis. My project, which is aimed at 
exploring the intergenerational process of trauma transmission, requires that attention be paid to 
the dialectical process of witnessing.  As I have already stated, trauma is transmitted via the body 
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in moments of affective misattunement, failures in recognition of the complex narratives 
embedded in somatic symptomology and the disavowal of unformulated and unbearable 
experience.  Relational theory begins to address these “failures” by emphasizing both the mutual 
influence of the clinical encounter and also the “bi-directional dance between patient and analyst 
that each person registers differently—a co-created dance governed by [what Jessica Benjamin 
calls] the third”  (Benjamin, 2009, p. 441).  In acknowledging and embodying mutual influence, 
there seems to be a strong possibility of intercepting (or at the very least acknowledging) the 
intergenerational transmission of trauma in a reparative un-dissociated relationally based 
analysis.   
 In this section I have chosen to focus on the work of contemporary relational theorists 
Lewis Aron, Jessica Benjamin and Susie Orbach, to examine how the intersubjective field 
illuminates issues related to the person to person transmission of trauma and the body.  I chose 
each of these theorists precisely because they each, in nuanced and specific ways, elaborate on 
the power of relational analysis to transform failures of witnessing that lead to shame, somatic 
distress and trauma transmission. 
Lewis Aron 
 Lewis Aron is the director of New York University’s Postdoctoral Program in 
Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, the recognized home base for the development of Relational 
theory.  In addition, Aron is the founding president of the International Association for 
Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (IARPP), a scholar of psychoanalytic history and 
an active figure in contemporary psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic education (Aron, 2011).  Of 
particular relevance to this project is Aron’s editing, along with Frances Sommer Anderson, of a 
1998 volume entitled Relational perspectives on the body.  This text represents a significant 
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intervention in contemporary psychoanalytic theorizing as its explicit aim is to “renew attention 
to the place of the body and somatic experience within a relational paradigm”  (Aron & 
Anderson, 1998, p. xxvii).    
Unable to move freely back and forth among different aspects of self, unable to 
utilize  their bodily sensations and their skin membrane to mediate between their 
subjective and  objective awareness, traumatized patients are unable to reflect on their 
traumatic experiences, self-reflexive functioning fails and the body is left to keep the 
score. (Aron & Anderson, 1998, p. 25) 
 
 As a scholar of psychoanalytic history, Lewis Aron, in his substantive contribution to 
Relational perspectives on the body, elaborates a deep understanding of the challenges facing 
clinicians when it comes to maintaining a focus on the physical body in treatment.  He draws on 
recent and historical explanations regarding this challenge while he integrates a relational 
understanding of somatic symptomology.   
    Aron is aware of the trend in psychoanalytic training away from drive-centered 
understandings of pathology to a focus on relational theory (p. xxvii).  He argues that perhaps 
one impact of the demedicalization of psychoanalytic training, the move away from the body and 
the emphasis on strength based approaches, is that the body can’t be legitimized as being in pain 
and distress.  Analysts who favor drive-theory must listen to the body, or at the very least the 
“bodily” expressions of sexuality.  On the contrary, interpersonally oriented analysts “have 
tended to neglect the body” and this leads to a “solvable” solution for the non-medical clinician 
to situate a body in pain as metaphor (p. xxvii). This turning away led Aron and his colleagues to 
organize their theoretical intervention around a redirection of attention to the body.   
 Lewis Aron also suggests that of all the contemporary means of understanding somatic 
symptomology, a relationally focused theorist such as himself, is strongly drawn to attachment 
based explanations that recognize the significance of self-reflexivity and mentalization in an 
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individual’s development.  Aron understands self-reflexivity to be defined as: “the mental 
capacity to move back and forth, and to maintain the tension, between a view of the self as 
subject ant a view of the self as object” (p. 5).  He believes this capacity to be diminished by 
“conflict, deficit and trauma” (p. 5).  Impairments in this capacity are thought to diminish a 
person’s capacity to participate in psychoanalytic treatment.  As I outlined in my Literature 
Review, Joyce McDougall (1989) argues that analysts are fearful of working with clients who 
are considered alexithymic, or unable to process feelings in language.  This inability “can 
activate somatic problems” and it is likely a result of this bind that many somatically 
preoccupied individuals do not receive substantive treatment (p.12).   
 Aron links up this perceived bind with another theorist Henry Krystal, who, like Fongay, 
articulates the significance of mentalization when it comes to an individual developing the 
capacity to verbally articulate “body states” (p. 12).  Aron understands mentalization as an 
intersubjective phenomena, and, like Krystal, believes that it is ultimately “a failure in the 
intersubjective processing of emotions” that psychosomatic disorders and alexithymic 
personality traits come about (p. 13).  Of significance here is the framing of this argument in 
explicit intersubjective framework.  Another way of putting this is, and as a result of 
mentalization, “our self is first and foremost a bodily self” and therefore, as we see with infant-
child interactions, “our relational experiences are first and foremost bodily experiences as well” 
(p.24). When an adult exhibits significant impairment in the intersubjective processing of 
emotions, Aron and Krystal argue that, at crucial points in that individual’s development, he/she 
must have felt they “had no right to usurp the mother’s prerogative in exercising caring and 
soothing functions” (p. 13).   
At moments when patients are unable to use reflexive awareness, the analyst must 
carry much of the analytic work, psychosomatically processing the patient’s 
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communications and employ his or her own transcendent function to bring together 
conscious with unconscious, body with affect, unformulated experience with words and 
symbols, self-as-subject with self-as-object. (p. 26) 
 
 In drawing on the work of McDougall, Krystal, Fongay and others, Aron presents a 
relationally oriented take on psychosomatics, especially in regards to understanding the etiology 
and function of somatic symptomology in the clinical encounter.  Instead of siding with some 
analysts who perceive alexithymia as a deterrent to psychoanalytic treatment, Aron prescribes 
intersubjective psychoanalytic treatment for somatic symptomology.  He emphasizes that a 
failure in self-reflexive processes is what ultimately leads to somatic manifestations and that the 
resumption of self-reflexive functioning is the key to restoration of an integrated and non-
alexithymic self.  He proposes that this reparation is possible particularly in intersubjective 
analysis, a space that enhances the capacity to “use potential space, to symbolize, to play ” and 
furthermore ideally improves “capacity for internal division and dialogue, healthy dissociation, 
standing in the spaces between realities and dialectical function of mind” (p.17 & 18).  These 
are, in fact, the very qualities that allow individuals to “maintain various aspects of themselves” 
and defines not only the benefit of analysis but the very core definition of self-observation in 
multiplicity (p.17).  
 Lewis Aron, in striving to re-engage other intersubjectively oriented analysts with the 
body, or, as he calls it, “the conjoint analytic skin-ego,” provided the groundwork for other 
seminal intersubjective theorists to further develop relational theories and practice (p. 26).  I will 
now explore some of the significant contributions of one of those theorists, Jessica Benjamin.   
Jessica Benjamin 
 Jessica Benjamin is a widely published analyst and theorist based in New York City.  She 
has published several books including The bonds of love:  Like subjects, love objects (Yale 
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University Press: 1995) and Shadow of the other: Intersubjectivity and gender in psychoanalysis 
(Routledge:  1998).  Benjamin is a founding member of the Stephen A. Mitchell Center for 
Relational Studies and is a faculty member at the NYU Postdoctoral Psychology Program in 
Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis.  She is known for her theories on mutual recognition and the 
incorporation of gender, sexuality and politics of power to psychoanalytic theory and practice, 
amongst others.  Due to her wide-ranging influence both in the field of feminist theory, 
psychoanalytic and philosophical theorizing and relational/intersubjective analytic practice, it 
will be necessary to limit my discussion of Benjamin’s significant contribution to Intersubjective 
and Relational theory to an exploration of her theory on mutual recognition as the core of 
intersubjectivity.  This contribution allows for nuanced insights regarding the challenge of 
witnessing and recognition when working with collective and interpersonal trauma. In both the 
therapeutic relationship and in interpersonal relationships, Benjamin notes that there is a 
necessity to “navigate the ebb and flow of dissociation and attunement” or what she calls 
“breakdowns in shared thirdness”  (Benjamin, 2009, p. 443).  These “breakdowns” or failures in 
witnessing or mutual recognition present an opportunity for trauma transmission as well as 
activation of shame amongst other affects and defenses.  In this section I will elaborate on the 
significance of Benjamin’s theorizing on this process and I will apply these theories to my case 
material both here and in the following Discussion chapter.   
 Jessica Benjamin believes, as do many relational theorists, that “the old one-person 
philosophy or psychology of subject and object—is precisely the problem” that intersubjectivity 
theories might solve (Benjamin, 2010, p. 248).  The solution, to Benjamin’s mind, involves: an 
embrace of dialectics, complex and multiple self- parts of analyst and patient at play, a sharing of 
critical knowledge’s of both parties, and an acknowledgement that being understood is an 
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intersubjective vulnerability and might require dependency on the other.  These elements are 
involved in the cultivation of a “shared third” which she defines as, “a dyad [that] moves at its 
own pace towards authentically contacting each other’s minds and creating shared understanding 
and shared procedural knowledge of one another” (Benjamin, 2004). The shared third allows for 
mutual recognition, a process of “breakdown and restoration of intersubjective space”  
(Benjamin, 2009, 441).  In other words, it is precisely in this expanded perspective, this 
perspective that allows for failures and repair, for “different dyadic pairings within the same 
relationship,” that might offer space for dissociated aspects of experience (especially old wounds 
that evoke feelings of shame and guilt) to emerge (p. 441).   
 It is at this juncture of the dissociated aspects of experience that simultaneously urgently 
want to be known and can’t tolerate the potential shame of exposure that I am positioning the 
body and its somatic manifestations of distress.  If the analyst is able to occupy the space of 
“believable witness, specific to the multiple parts of the patient,” and if the shared third can 
tolerate the inevitability of failures and enactments, then “symbolic repetition of old wounds we 
have struggled to avoid” might be met with less disregulation and therefore the dyad can “make 
use of what has been revealed” (p.444).  It is precisely in the acknowledgement of the “felt 
experience of having recreated the original injury” that the analyst in this dyad does indeed 
“invite the abandoned, shamed and wounded part to become more vocal”  (p.444).  The analyst’s 
own level of comfort with failure, with occupying the position of the doer, the oppressor, the 
narcissistic parent, facilitates the incorporation of previously unformulated and dissociated 
experience.  More to the point, this process allows for the “shameful self that was afraid to be 
found yet clamoring to be heard” to be freed up when the analyst is not assumed as superior 
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authority (p.445).  One aspect of the self “clamoring to be heard” might be the story embedded in 
a body in pain.     
  I would like to emphasize that expecting the patient to contain or survive some 
 knowledge of our failures is neither asking him to hold the hot potato, be our container, 
 or absorb all the badness in the relationship.  It should serve to reveal how the analyst 
 takes on the responsibility for forgiving herself and thus being able to transcend the 
 shame of her difficulties enough to talk about and analyze them. . . This would help 
 create a shared third, take account of what each one has been hearing, how each has been 
 listening to what is happening. It is an action that develops faith in the moral third 
 because it affirms the lawful ethic of responsibility and counteracts past experiences of 
 denial.  (p. 449-50) 
     
 Benjamin’s work, as does much of Relational theory, challenges me, as a white woman, 
to be willing to see in myself aspects of my case subjects (Olive and Lucy).  Shame and guilt, 
oppressor and oppressed.  I am complicit, I encounter my texts, my “subjects,” with horror and 
empathy, both.  The extent to which I see, recognize and keep alive the notion of a moral third 
(in this encounter) is contingent on the extent to which I can tolerate my own guilt and shame, 
the aspects of my experience that speak to oppression and enacting oppression.  There have been 
moments when I have felt as if my project, a project aimed at, on some level, empathizing with 
white South Africans’ experience of physical and psychic pain, might be perceived as politically 
incorrect, or an active disavowal or non-recognition of the immensity and ongoing violence that 
black South Africans have and continue to experience in colonial and postcolonial moments.  
Much like Benjamin, in her reflections on the challenge of “seeing both the victim and 
perpetrator sides of ourselves” while working with Israelis and Palestinians from Occupied 
Territory, I questioned my own entanglement with the stories of Lucy and Olive (Benjamin, 
2012, p. 210).  To empathize, to recognize, the suffering of white South African women, I run 
the risk of “abandoning those who feel guilty” in order to maintain my own goodness (p. 210).  
 The challenge then, of working with and amidst unacknowledged trauma (collective 
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and/or individual) is that it requires the witness to “maintain the simultaneity of positions” in the 
form of “attesting to wrongdoings as well as suffering--“  always related and linked states (p. 
210).  To think of white South African women as always already victim and victimizer is to, as a 
witness, keep alive the moral third.  We must, Benjamin argues (whether working with 
individual or collective trauma), “allow ourselves to realize how each person bings multiple self 
parts to the engagement with suffering . . .we must necessarily struggle to recognize these painful 
and frightening parts in ourselves if we are to be witnesses”  (p.213).  In this challenge, the 
complexity of the lives and experiences of Olive and Lucy come into fuller view, their 
experience rehumanized by my assertion that “horror and suffering [all of it] really matters”  
(p.213).  Not only does this stance potentially allow for embodied treatment/understanding to 
come about, thus intervening in the intergenerational transmission of trauma via the body, but it 
also demands an “understanding of the fears and anxieties that drive people to commit crimes [or 
participate actively or passively in the violence of colonialism etc.]”  (p.213).   
 The dialectics of witnessing applies to me too and, for this reason, I have been deeply 
moved and inspired by the work of Susie Orbach, whose embodied practice of relational 
analysis, conveys a model for enlivening treatment with mutual recognition.  In the following 
section I will focus on a discussion of Orbach’s reflections on her analytic work with somatic 
symptomology and intergenerational transmission of trauma. 
Susie Orbach 
 Lewis Aron and Jessica Benjamin provide an excellent overview of the significant 
contributions of relational theorists to contemporary clinical practice.  However, in the process of 
challenging the “fundamental place of the drives in psychoanalysis,” relational theorists have 
been critiqued for “giving up too much and [losing] sight of the body”  (Aron, 1998 p. xxv).  
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Theorizing the treatment of a person whose body has been demonstratively neglected of 
metallization experiences is important, but, in large part, this project aims to provide insight into 
not only the problems facing the treatment of the body in clinical work but also aims to provide 
solutions.  For a clear strategy utilizing a relational lens, I will now reflect on the work of Susie 
Orbach. 
 A contemporary of Jessica Benjamin, Susie Orbach has worked for many years to 
integrate feminist critical theory with the practice of psychoanalysis.  To this end, in 1976 she 
and Luise Eichenbaum founded the Women’s Therapy Centre Institute in London and due to the 
popularity of this effort, established a similar center in New York in 1981. These centers 
provided a space in which the study and practice of feminism, psychoanalysis and social/cultural 
institutions were explored.  Currently, the centers offer a post-doc program utilizing a cultural-
relational psychoanalytic framework as well as public programs with a recent emphasis on eating 
disorders. 
 Like the psyches we are bequeathed…so the bodies we are bequeathed and create, and 
 with which we all live, have everything to do with the cultural and psychological  
 disposition of the bodies of those who first gave us our bodies as well as, of course, our 
 internalization of their experience of their bodies. (p. 93) 
 
 Susie Orbach has written and reflected on the role of the body in the analytical encounter 
for many years.  In her 2009 book, Bodies, Orbach extends the themes identified by Esther 
Rashkin (transgenerational transmission of trauma) and applies them, as I have similarly 
attempted to do, to the body. One particularly poignant theme that Orbach discusses is what she 
calls the “transgenerational transmission of anxious embodiment” (p. 12).  Unlike Rashkin, who 
conceptualizes phantom transmissions as a long-occurring phenomenon, in her clinical work, 
Orbach claims that, a “new and troubling” theme of “distressed parental bodies” operating 
“inside the body experience of adults” has become more notable in her contemporary practice (p. 
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12).  Despite these distinctions, both Orbach and Rashkin are practicing analysts who actively 
engage in an analysis of popular cultural production to illuminate these themes.  My project is 
strongly influenced by this interdisciplinary method.   
 One of Orbach’s most compelling publications is a 2006 article published in the journal 
Studies in Gender and Sexuality entitled, “How can we have a body?:  Desires and corporeality.”  
This article puts forth an argument regarding transmission of trauma via the body that Orbach 
arrived at over the course of her years of clinical practice.  In her article, Orbach argues that 
contemporary psychoanalysis continues to theorize bodily symptoms in a limited and singularly 
mentalist framework, thus failing to fully address the body and therefore, “missing crucial 
dimensions of the patient’s experience”  (Orbach, 2006, p. 89).  The strength of Orbach’s 
critique is embedded in her case examples offered in this article and in the relational 
methodological framework she demonstrates via these analytic cases.  
 Orbach’s understanding of the origins of her patients’ experience of their own troubled 
bodies emerges from an attachment perspective.  She begins her discussion of working 
intersubjectively with these troubled (and somatically preoccupied) bodies by situating empathic 
misattunements and failures of mentalization as on explanation for the “fixed structure” of a 
body marked by “instability” (p. 92).  This instability, Orbach argues, is akin to identity 
diffusion, to a state of being lost and without security.  As a result, a person who experienced 
instability in regards to his/her body and attachment will make “many attempts to engage his [or 
her] physical sense” (p. 92).  Orbach traces these frantic attempts at engagement via her case 
material, clinical work that reveals the mutuality of corporeal exploration and healing.  These 
attempts are muddled by the fact of intergenerational transmission: 
If we think about it, it becomes obvious that the bodies we occupy are the 
embodiment of our parental bodies and our sibling bodies, their wishes for our bodies, 
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their projections onto our bodies and our making what we can of their bodies in our body. 
(p. 95, emphasis mine) 
 
 It is as a result of the fact of this transmission of wishes, projections and, in many cases 
“one false body to another,” that Orbach is able to make a strong argument for the reality that the 
body is a relational body, a predicament she calls “corporeal intersubjectivity” (p. 100, 96 & 97).  
This simple but profound argument presents challenges to the clinician in treatment, especially 
when a clinician, like Orbach, is faced with a somatically troubled and neglected body such as 
that of Colette.   
 The case of Colette, as described in Orbach’s article, is the story of the somatically 
informed treatment of a “capable, nimble spiritually inclined 38-year-old mother of four” who 
was the daughter of a British colonial doctor and a French Egyptian mother (p. 98).  Colette 
reported struggling with bulimia since adolescence with almost daily bingeing and purging.  
Over the course of their analysis, Orbach describes a growing awareness of her own 
“disagreeable and disgruntled body,” a body that, “just a session earlier felt physically settled” 
(p.99).  What Orbach realized she was experiencing in relation Collette was her client's  
necessarily constructed “false body: a body that had adapted. . . a body whose existence was so 
fragile that it came alive only in response to the recovery from impingement”  (p. 99).  When 
considered in the context of Winnicott’s (1965) explanations on the development of the false 
self, we can see that Colette may very well have been required to develop a sense of self that 
would affirm her own mother’s mothering capabilities, thus reassuring her mother and endlessly 
“adapting and shaping” herself to what her mother was capable of receiving (Orbach, p. 99). 
 The challenge of treatment, given this setup, Orbach claims, is to simultaneously hold 
that, while patients deserve “desiring bodies that are pleasurable and generative to them,” they 
must “have bodies in the first place” (p. 98).  The goal in Orbach’s treatment was to assist 
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Colette in: “accepting the hated body,” “understanding the origins of body hatred,” incorporating 
the therapists’ body and the therapist’s desire for the client to have a body, accessing an 
integrated body and establishing a means by which this body could be “affectively organized” 
rather than a series of “sensations craving management”  (p. 100, 101 & 106).  Throughout the 
course of the case study we as readers are made aware of the sheer difficulty of this project.  But 
why is it so difficult for Colette to have a body?   
 Much like the defense of projective identification, it was via an unconscious and visceral 
conveyance that Colette alerted Orbach to a trauma central to her body-less state.  After a session 
with Colette, Orbach describes experiencing “intense burning across my skin”  (p. 103).  Orbach 
was reminded of the content of their session in which Colette told the story of the accidental 
death of her older brother (before she was born he fell onto the stove and burned to death while 
in the care of his paternal grandparents).  It was through this “burning sensation” that Colette 
“encod[ed] a sense of grief, horror, agony, shame, fear and hesitation that may have lain inside 
her mother’s body and that her mother brought to her physical mothering of Colette”  (p. 103).  
The “inert body terror,” Orbach notes, was “not amenable to dispersement; it could only be 
passed on” (p. 103).   
 This intergenerational transmission of trauma, much like Rashkin’s arguments regarding 
phantom transmissions, so often occurs via the body and leads to a predicament in which the 
“raw material” of the receiver of the transmission’s body “is saturated with the damaged bodies 
of their internal body relationships” (p. 107).  Given this process and its devastating implications, 
a treatment goal of assisting in the establishment of corporeal coherence must be established.  
Based on her own experience of Colette and other similar cases, Orbach warns that, given our 
own body unhappiness, it is possible that we as clinicians “can miss the severity of [our client’s] 
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disease” (p. 107).  In fact, she also warns, we may find ourselves applauding or envying their 
flight to “health and self-regulation”  (p. 107).  But again, Orbach reminds her reader, these 
bodies are co-constructed, and if a patient is to achieve a coherent and stable sense of 
corporeality, so must we as clinicians. 
  Our body is not veiled and impenetrable, even if we sit at the side of or behind the 
 patient.  Without conscious awareness we have sent out a visual acknowledgement of the 
 impact of their corporeality on our own.  And with our various physical registerings….we 
 invite possibility, take on a range of transference-countertransference positions and 
 entwinements that will provide part of the corporeal force field for our engagement.  
 (Orbach, 2006, p. 96-7) 
 
 Initially, I came to implicate myself in this project around the concept of locating myself 
socially in order to circumvent potential bias and address the obvious questions regarding the 
specificity of my choice of subject (i.e. the white female-bodied South African colonial and post-
colonial predicament). Due to the structure and demands of intersubjective theory, as explained 
by Jessica Benjamin, it is essential for the clinician or, in this case, the reader, to position the self 
in relation to the client, or in this case, the text(s).  To avoid bias, I experienced the necessity of 
positioning myself as one reader, one self, in regards to the textual analysis.  As social workers 
we are taught that in locating our biopsychosocial identity, we might enact transparency in 
regards to potential bias as it may impact our differently situated client(s) (Hays, 2007).  In this 
project, I am a biased (a European American female-identified middle class academic and 
clinician in training at a prestigious graduate school in New England) reader of the identified 
texts, one reader among many other differently situated people.  As I stated in Chapter two, my 
project aims to investigate the unconscious subjective experiences of white South African 
women and their bodies in order to complicate discourses about trauma, illness, violence, race 
and forgiveness in both academic and clinical discourses in the western world.  In situating 
myself biopsychosocially in relation to this explicit aim, do I let myself “off the hook” so to 
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speak?  In other words, I have begun to wonder if this knee-jerk acknowledgement of social 
identity serves another purpose altogether, one that functions to erase the embodied being of the 
clinician, the reader, and by extension, the patient, the subject. 
We cannot give our patients the opportunity to find bodies for themselves because 
our anxieties about our bodies can be so severe that sitting with two anxious or self-
hating or bodyless bodies it too difficult.  If we are interested in making it possible for 
others to be in their [our client’s] lives and to feel them as generative and animated, then 
a far more demanding engagement is required of us in relation to our own bodies and 
personal proclivities, discontents and longings.  (Orbach, 2006, p. 108) 
 
 As I have stated, Relational theory and especially the clinical case work described by 
Orbach, provide an opportunity to consider the implications of a relationally constituted body.  
This body is both determined by intergenerational transmissions of trauma and aspiration as well 
as attachment styles and genetic material.  So, it follows that my body, the body of this writer, 
would also be a relational body.  As a clinician, I am most strongly aware of this fact via 
countertransferences with clients.  However, the concept of body based countertransference, as 
outlined by Susie Orbach, had not begun to permeate my being until I engaged in this project.   
Conclusion 
 Relational theory has provided me a language and encouragement to situate my body and 
multiple aspects of self as constitutive of this research project.  Over the course of this project I 
have become ever more aware of the ease with which I, like Olive Schreiner, consciously 
attempt to lose my body, to disappear it from my daily experience.  In part, this is because I, like 
Olive and Lucy, occupy and am impacted by a body that is “troubled.”  This body has 
experienced misrecognition, not being know-able, ineffective functioning and continues to 
“enunciate” itself in certain instance of “extreme distress” much to my dismay (Orbach, 2006, p. 
96).  Most significantly, this body is also a relational body, and deeply so.  I know what it is to 
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wonder what other forces and energies reside in this being and as a result, am drawn to Rashkin’s 
phantom transmission explanations.  To know these things, to untangle them, has meant that, as a 
clinician, I have been able to challenge myself to listen with and through my body.  
Consequently, there are moments in my clinical work when my own false body meets my 
client’s false body in a salute of recognition.  At other times, and particularly when working with 
clients struggling with severe eating disorders, the depth of distress and betrayal I have 
experienced in relationship to my own corporeality allows for a deeper understanding of the 
horror with which my client sits in his/her physical being.     
  In the course of a psychoanalytic journey, patient and analyst come to share a 
 psychoanalytic skin-ego or psychoanalytic breathing ego…Gradually, patient and analyst 
 mutually regulate each other’s behaviors, enactments and states of consciousness such 
 that each gets under the other’s skin, each reaches into the other’s guts, each is breathed 
 in and absorbed by the other.  (Aron, p. 26) 
 
 Relational theory has assisted me in my quest to more deeply understand the mechanism 
by which trauma is transmitted via the body.  Of particular significance in this regard was Lewis 
Aron’s framing of alexithymia and a failure of self-reflexive functioning (that often manifest in 
somatic symptomology) as an intersubjective rupture.  In other words, a caregiver (or I would 
argue… `a la collective unconscious), society’s or clinician’s incapacity to provide metallization 
experiences for an individual (“reflections of our bodies [are] conveyed in turn by the bodily 
actions of our caretakers”), then self-reflection cannot be regulated and unhealthy dissociation in 
the form of psychosomatic distress results (Aron, p. 25).  Furthermore, Jessica Benjamin 
elucidates an engaging set of questions concerning the relational challenge of mutual recognition 
and Susie Orbach, in a brilliant article (2006) outlines a compelling narrative of an embodied and 
relationally oriented, clinical treatment.  In the next chapter, I will use a corporeal textual 
analysis to discuss the relevance of Relational and Feminist theories to more fully apprehending 
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In a 2006 New York Times Book Review of Alexandra Fuller’s memoir recounting her 
childhood growing up “in a country (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) where white men still ruled” 
(Scribbling the cat: Travels with an African soldier, Penguin Books, 2005), Stephen Clingman 
writes of his admiration of Fuller’s narrative voice stating, “as much as the Fullers are pushed by 
external circumstances, it is also personal tragedy that drives them. One of the achievements of 
the book is somehow to make it clear that their private anguish mirrors the larger lunacies in 
which they are involved”  (Clingman, 2006, p. 26).  Similarly, in my case material, the bodies of 
Olive Schreiner and Lucy, when attended to via feminist and relationally oriented theoretical 
lenses, evoke the destabilizing impact of living as a white woman in colonial and postcolonial 
South Africa.  Like the Fullers, Olive and Lucy are inheritors of the ghosts of white colonial 
desire and violence.  Unlike the Fullers however, Olive and Lucy oppose the racial tyranny of 
colonial imperialism in South Africa and are nonetheless deeply and somatically impacted by 
their circumstances.  
 In the following chapter I apply feminist and relational theories to my case material.  
Specifically I am integrating theses theories with the aforementioned: the published letters of 
Olive Schreiner and the novel Disgrace.  As previously stated, my specific focus in exploring 
both of these texts is situated in a corporeal reading of the characters of Olive (real/historical) 
and Lucy (imagined).  I trace the intergenerational transmission of traumas via the bodies of 
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these two white South African women.  I explore the somatic distress in the lives of Olive and 
Lucy, and develop a more nuanced understanding of the legacy of colonial violence.  
Furthermore, with reference to feminist and relational theoretical approaches, I suggest a clinical 
intervention in the transmission of trauma via the bodies of Olive and Lucy by attending to the 
unformulated aspects of their psychic experience as expressed in somatic symptomology.  
Review of Relevant Theories 
 Alexithymia is an explanation for a seeming incapacity or challenge in utilizing language 
to adequately describe emotions, an inability to distinguish between feelings and the bodily 
sensations of emotional arousal, a deficit in drive-fulfilled fantasies, and a constricted imaginal 
process  (Taylor, Bagby, Parker, 1999).  This formulation can and does explain any number of 
body based symptomology, such as anxorexia nervosa, irritable bowel syndrome, certain 
personality disorders, fibromyalgia and substance abuse.  While handy as a catch-all for somatic 
manifestations of psychic distress, I utilized this concept to specifically describe the dissociative 
element of the white colonial experience that is transferred to “post” colonial subjects.  The 
dissociation, expressed as a seeming inability hold in conscious awareness the horrors of 
colonialism for both oppressors and oppressed individuals and communities often manifest, like 
other collective traumas (such as the Holocaust in Europe) in subsequent generations (Laub, 
2005).  I use the framework of the alexithymia of the colonial predicament (and all the disavowal 
it implies) to attend to the ways in which Olive Schreiner’s internal concepts of 
will/power/erotics of power/desire/gender/land/identity/pain/suffering are elucidated, in part, via 
her body (and more precisely through chronic somatic pain and preoccupation).  Alongside the 
voice of Olive, I place Coetzee’s character of Lucy, a possible inheritor of Olive’s disavowed 
trauma.  Their words and psychic experience constitute the case material for this project.   
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 In the past two chapters I have discussed feminist and relational theories’ relevance to my 
topic of intergenerational transmission of trauma via white South African women’s bodies.  In 
particular I am interested in how these two theoretical lenses might illuminate the challenge of 
understanding and treating somatic symptomology in a clinical encounter.  As Muriel Dimen 
notes, relational and feminist theories are not at cross-purposes: 
The psychoanalytic efforts to deconstruct the dominance of an objectively 
knowing subject in favor of a personal subjectivity parallel recent feminist efforts to 
disrupt the conventional oppositions and their encoding in gender hierarchies.  The 
question of how we envision dissolving the ever-recurring complementarities, especially 
the idealizations intrinsic to binary hierarchies, is common to each.  (Dimen, M., & 
Harris, A., 2001, p. 45).   
 
In their mutual commitment to the significance of personal subjectivity and a challenge to 
purely intrapsychic explanations of pathology, feminist and relational theories serve to 
compliment what I have identified as a deficit in current empirical and theoretical literature 
addressing clinical treatment and understanding of somatic preoccupations.   
 Significant contemporary research (Sansone et al., 2009; van der Kolk, 1994, 2000) on 
the neurobiological and somatic implications of trauma has informed the cultivation of body-
informed psychotherapies (eg: Sensorimotor therapy, SomaCentric Dialoging, Hakomi, Somatic 
Experiencing, SHIP (Spontaneous Healing Intrasystemic Process), Internal Family Systems, 
Mindfulness-based body practices, Craniosacrial therapy and EMDR). These therapeutic 
developments are important as a means of integrating, for individuals who have experienced 
significant trauma and/or individuals whose early childhood was marked by a severe lack of 
adequate experiences of mentalization, split off emotional experiences.  Somatic distress then, in 
this context, becomes coherent and an affirmation of the fact that “emotion is essentially 
psychosomatic” (McDougall, 1989, p. 95).     
82 
 
 What distinguishes my project, and its engagement with relational and feminist theories, 
from a simple endorsement of body-based therapies, is that I demonstrate the importance of 
attending to the interpsychic dimension of somatic preoccupation.  In other words, by focusing 
on the process of intergenerational transmission of trauma via the body (and utilizing the 
alexithymia of the colonial predicament as an example) I use relational and feminist theories to 
strategically propose that current somatic therapies may fall short in sustainable trauma repair if 
the following factors are not considered:  an exploration of possible ancestral haunting of the 
body/psyche of a patient; the impact of institutions of power and social context in relation to 
bodily distress; and the clinician’s own relationship to bodily distress and phantom haunting. 
Case Material 
 In the following section I will explore the resonances of three broad themes as they 
emerge in the letters of Olive Schreiner, the character of Lucy and the dyadic pairing of the two 
women.  Themes include:  trauma transmission via the white female body, especially due to 
unknowable traumas from past and inadequate means for self-expression; guilt, shame and 
unacknowledged desire as a legacy of the violence of colonialism as expressed by white South 
African women; and disavowal and dissociation as defenses in the face of the disappointments, 
violence and desires implicated in the colonial and postcolonial predicament. 
Olive 
 Many of the letters analyzed in this section were acquired via the online website “Olive 
Schreiner Letters Online”  (http://www.oliveschreiner.org/). The vast majority of Schreiner’s 
personal correspondences are available in published form as well.  Several letters included here 
are published in a volume (Olive Schreiner Letters: Volume 1: 1871-1899) edited by Richard 
Rive (1987).  The online project organized some 4800 Schreiner letters, located in sixteen 
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archives on three continents.  The primary editor of the letters is Liz Stanley, a professor at The 
University of Edinburgh, and a Schreiner scholar.  The totality of the archive, Olive’s life and 
history, and all that it entails could and does get addressed in many published scholarly books 
and articles (e.g.: Only an Anguish to Live Here: Olive Schreiner and the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-
1902 (1992), Not Without Honour: The Life and Writings of Olive Schreiner, by Vera Buchanan-
Gould (Hutchinson, 1948) Memories of Olive Schreiner, by Lyndall Gregg [Dot Schreiner], 
(Chambers, 1957), Olive Schreiner Her Friends and Times, by D. L. Hobman, (Watts & Co, 
1955), A Track to the Water's Edge, The Olive Schreiner Reader by Howard Thurman (Harper & 
Row, 1973), Rereading the imperial romance:  British Imperialism and South African Resistance 
in Haggard, Schreiner, and Plaatjeand by Laura Chrisman (Oxford University Press, 2000) and 
Imperialism, Labour and the New Woman: Olive Schreiner’s Social theory by Liz Stanley 
(Routledge, 2002)). 
 Due to the enormity of interest in Schreiner as well as the massiveness of the archive, I 
kept my aim quite narrow.  Surprisingly, the online archive is not, in any way, oriented around, 
nor does it specifically reference, Schreiner’s well-documented history of somatic instability.  
Instead, the focus of the online archive of her letters highlights her thoughts on: socialism, 
feminism, marriage, colonialism, South African politics, capitalism and imperialism.  Utilizing 
specific search words that indicated Olive’s various physical traumas (“pregnancy,” “asthma,” 
“fainting”), I was able to access letters that included Olive’s musings on her own somatic 
experience. 
 I set out to makes sense of Olive’s letters.  I wanted to open up the complexity of her 
somatic distress in ways that validated the implications of her experience and the ways that her 
body was not simply sexually repressed, but actually deeply impacted by the legacies of her 
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colonial ancestors and her contemporary (and deeply conflict-ridden) social environment.  I 
aimed to describe and analyze the ways that Olive’s psychic and physical distress are important 
indicators of larger societal dysfunction.   
 What I discovered within myself, perhaps understandably, was a significant ease in 
approaching a contemporary character such as Lucy from Disgrace.  It was much more difficult 
to stay with and bear witness to Olive’s somatic annunciations.  I found myself distracted, trying 
frequently to sublimate this discomfort and uncertainty by focusing on Lucy’s experience.  
Olive’s letters as corporeal text are jarring, speaking to fragmentation within her thoughts and 
identity.  So many contradictions (national identity, gender and sexual identity, relationship to 
race/racism, political beliefs) are simply held within Olive, ping-ponging as she expresses 
longing and despair, excitement and confidence, fear and pleasure, groundedness and unhoming.  
As I explored in the Phenomenology chapter, Olive Schreiner’s personal childhood was 
unpleasant and marked by what she simultaneously sees as injustice (economic strife, being 
forced to leave and work outside the home at an early age, frequent hunger, lack of affection) 
and personally deserved abuse. 
I remember when I was a little child being whipped till I could hardly stand by a 
big brother twelve years older than myself whom I worshipped, because I didn’t open a 
door  quickly.  I hadn’t the least feeling of resentment or injustice.  I only crept away 
and felt as if my heart was broken. When I remember what a wild indomitable child I was 
and how fiercely I resented injustice, it stands out to me as a most remarkable case of 
instinct over-riding everything.  I remember distinctly that I did not feel the least trace of 
unlove, only for weeks when I looked at his hands I used to quiver.  I couldn’t bear to 
think it was they that hurt me.  This feeling I believe is lay dormant in woman, it always 
exists when she loves a man. . . now because women are not free, because that sweet and 
happily given service with the pleasure element being delight in bearing pain for him 
cannot be there if the man is not the one a woman chooses, but simply the one who offers 
her the  best means of livelihood. It is woman’s irony that she has to sell herself, whether 
into the bitter loveless childless deformed untender state of prostitution or into loveless 
marriage.  I often wish I were a man just that I might be tender to women.  It must be so 
glorious to have the same unlimited power and use it magnanimously.  (Olive Schreiner 




 Confronting her letters reminded me of how I began this project—with a strong critique 
of the psychiatric establishment’s seeming discomfort with and avoidance of (especially) 
women’s frank descriptions and display of somatic symptomology in mental health settings.  
Although Freud himself (Freud, 1886) complicated his initial thoughts on hysteria in women, my 
clinical work has brought me into contact with many mental health practitioners who continue to 
endorse the notion that somatic distress is a manifestation of purely intrapsychic conflict with 
little to no consideration of the relational and collective context within which a “hysteric” 
suffers.  
 In my attempts to elevate the character of Olive from sexually repressed colonialist to 
that of a coherent and complex woman in whom the violence of her ancestors was written on her 
body, I felt stuck.  I experienced within myself an alignment with these so-called “establishment” 
mental health professionals who avert their eyes, can’t access curiosity, simply want to fix the 
symptom, tired of the litany of symptoms and ensuing despair.  I knew that her symptoms, her 
physical and emotional distress were important, but struggled to articulate why.  I also desired a 
more physically and psychically comfortable life for Olive.  So too did many doctors in her time.  
She was offered various drug treatments and surgeries (including: sniffing quinine, cold 
sponging, taking iron, Chlorodyne, various narcotics, directives to stop writing, drier weather 
(South African climate), cooler/more damp weather (climate typical of England)) for her 
ailments (including: asthma, pain in the shoulder, angina, twisted womb, anxiety, severe 
depression, trouble eating (esp. socially), measles, amenorrhea, preoccupation with dying and 
multiple miscarriages) (Rive, R. ed, 1988).  It is to be noted that various doctors and healers were 
employed to assist Olive in explaining and combatting her symptoms.  However, she often 
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received differing opinions, often tinged with medical doctors’ disbelief at the reliability of her 
ailments (“They all say they have never seen a case just like it [Olive’s supposed debilitating 
asthma]” (Rive, R., ed., p.44)).     
 In her letters there is a stark resignation (“My asthma is bad, I fight for breath, but it 
doesn’t matter.”) that comes from Olive that is almost suffocating to bear (Olive Schreiner to 
Havelock Ellis, lines 6&7).  There are moments when her physical health issues so consume her 
existence that she expresses suicidal ideation, increasingly melancholic longings for whatever 
continent she is not currently inhabiting (Europe vs. Africa) and despairs at the prospect of 
improvement in her own condition and possibility of an end to violence in South Africa.   
  I am getting worse and worse.  I can’t get better. . . The thought of you is all that helps 
 me in this agony and loneliness.  Where shall I go? What shall I do?  Such agony comes 
 over me to think of becoming a real invalid and having no where to go.  (p.55) 
 
 Throughout her life, Olive remains deeply confused about belonging, citing a desire to 
find a home, a home where she can be well, far too frequently to reference extensively here.  She 
regularly debates the qualities of the place in which she is currently not living, often despairing 
about how much better she would feel if only she were in England when in South Africa and 
South Africa when in England,  
It is true about that self losing.  As soon as my body gets weak, so that the old 
original nature comes up, the strong individuality, then my whole soul cries out, not 
‘from  infinite’, not ‘from God to God’.  I don’t want to die.  I don’t want anything I love 
to die,  nothing must lose its individuality.  I woke up last night shouting and crying.  It 
isn’t only that I’m weak.  I always get into this state when I live utterly alone in England 
and see only the sea roaring out my window.  (p. 57) 
 
Even in periods of improvement in her health, Olive interestingly continues to describe her 
strong emotional experiences via physical terms, indicating that, above all else, for her entire life, 
her body and mind remained intimately connected.   
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 Have you ever had internal hemorrhage, and they give you ice and the flow stops at once, 
 and you always feel a curious kind of gratitude to the ice?  You always seemed to me like 
 a lump of ice put on a wound from which one was bleeding to death and freezing it up. 
 (Rive, R., ed., p.179) 
 
 Olive’s despair, her expression of a stance of victimization, might be reflective of a 
determination to find a way to make sense of her past (“the agony of my childhood”), contain her 
tragic and traumatized origins, in order to maintain her sense of power (p. 212).   
You remember long ago I told you how, nearly 20 years ago, when I was at 
Dordech, I had such a horror of eating before people, I couldn’t, and how I used to have 
to eat alone, and how it kept on all the time my periods stayed away, and I told you what 
unkind, untrue things they said about it.  Well, there came some people here ten days ago, 
from the Cape, I think, or they knew people there, and they have been talking to all the 
people at the Hotel about it.  They have heaps of money.  They sit and jeer at me at the 
table.  I’m hunted to death.  If I stayed here a little time longer, I must die.  I am going to 
Florence.  My cough is bad too and I feel so weak that it has taken me all day to think 
clearly  enough to write this.  Harry, the world isn’t fair, I haven’t sinned so much more 
than other people to be hunted down so.  If it goes on a little more I will kill myself.  Oh, 
I’ve been so desolate all my life Harry.  I’ve never had a home, I’ve never had anyone to 
take care of me like other girl did have. I was thrown out onto the world when I was 
eleven, and even before that I hadn’t a real home.  Oh, you who’ve never been turned out 
of a house, don’t know what it is.  (Rive, R.,ed. P.151) 
 
 But the relentlessness of Olive’s condition, her suffering, is hard to bear, knowing that 
she was writing and experiencing this stance at a time (1889) when her fellow British 
countryman, Cecil Rhodes and his South Africa Company were actively colonizing South Africa 
and profiting immensely from dominating natural resources there.  As Georgina Horrell (2004) 
points out, we can potentially read the external signs, Schreiner’s somatic preoccupation, her 
“fragility, her physical lack” as a way to remove herself from “the harsh complicity of white 
militarized society, detached from quotidian existence” under colonial rule (p.771).  While 
critical of the policies of British colonial rule and the thrust of capitalism fueling this 
imperialism, Olive was remarkably consumed by her own sense of persecution (as a woman, a 
poor white, a sick woman, an increasingly well-known socialist and feminist and a popular 
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female writer) that she frequently lost perspective, possibly sublimating her own outrage at the 
social and political turmoil and oppressive violence into what Freud may have deemed hysteria 
(Freud, 1986).   
Did I ever tell you how my chest first got bad? I was four days quite without food, 
and travelling all the time; I had nothing but a little cold water all that time.  I had no 
money  to buy food.  When I ate the first mouthful at the end of the time I got this horrible 
agony  in my chest, and had to rush out, and for weeks I never lay down, night or day. I 
suffocated if I even leaned back.  Ever since that, if I get to a place that is close, and 
damp and hot, it comes back.  I have been to so many doctors, some say it is an affection 
of the heart, some say it is asthma of a very peculiar kind… Somehow one can’t go back 
into the past without blaming those that are dearest to one, and it is better to let the past 
bury its dead eh?  I have not been able to go on any walks…. (Rive, R., ed., p. 44) 
 
 It was only in revisiting Esther Rashkin’s notion of phantom haunting and cryptology, 
that I was able to get a handle on Olive’s letters.  In her psychoanalytic character analysis of 
fictional narrative, Rashkin’s interpretations apprehend the phantoms lodged in the bodies of 
characters as reflected in their narratives.  As a reminder, these phantoms are not explicitly 
repressed memories in the character, but rather reflections of the intergenerational transmission 
of disavowed affective experiences related to trauma(s) experienced by a character’s 
anscestor(s).  Engaging in this manner, with the idea of Olive’s body as a crypt, a ghostly 
container, a receptacle of intergenerational trauma, an important signal, reminded me that 
Olive’s distress is connected to a larger context of social and cultural imperatives to disavow the 
violent and aggressive desires of colonialism in Africa.  While so focused on her own somatic 
preoccupations, the larger weight of what Olive was carrying went unrecognized, unexposed to 
light. Olive herself clearly stated that she did not see much usefulness in dwelling on the pain of 
the past, though I imagine she very much longed for repair of past traumas.  What Rashkin offers 
me in terms of perspective on the complexity of Olive Schreiner, is an assertion that, what an 
individual experiences as haunting, as a lingering and persistent pain, likely indeed is ghostly 
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residue.  In other words, the pervasiveness of Olive’s distress, emotional/physical and psychic, 
indicates more than the weak constitution of a woman determined to possess more freedoms than 
her cultural moment could provide.  Her ‘darkness’ is, according to Rashkin, the 
unacknowledged ‘darkness’ of her ancestors.  In the context of a country like South Africa, in 
which black Africans are in the majority, on another level, I wonder what Olive’s ancestors’ 
relationship to ‘darkness’ might mean? 
 I am much better though not quite strong after the miscarriage I had the last week at 
 Johannesburg.  I knew I should never go my time in all that sorrow and darkness. . . You 
 see the better half of the English nation is moving for us now, but I fear me it is too late.  
 (Olive Schreiner to Isie Smuts nee Krige, lines 10-17) 
 
 But I’ve had another miscarriage—all my own fault riding a rough horse and I had to ride 
 on for two hours in that state till we got to farm house.  I feel so depressed mentally.  It’s 
 so easy to forgive other people but so hard to forgive yourself for doing a foolish thing.  
 (Olive Schreiner to Betty Molteno, lines 38-44) 
 
 I am pregnant again but only in the very early stage.  If I don’t have a miscarriage I shall 
 be ill in January or February.  I am going to try and take great care of myself that all may 
 go well.  The worst is I’m so stupid and lazy.  I’m quite well, but so disinclined to work.  
 I’d like to be a cow and lie in a big meadow and chew the cud all day!  (Olive Schreiner 
 to Betty Molteno, lines 10-15) 
 
 Reflecting on the work of Jessica Benjamin I am reminded not to disavow the 
“oppressor,” to remember that the discomfort I might have been experiencing all along in regards 
to Olive was my own identification with her all-consuming distress and subsequent paralyzing 
shame.  As I mentioned in the Relational theory chapter, I too understand what it is to be 
betrayed by a body that works inadequately, a body whose distress and dysfunction expose 
vulnerability.  In the face of this vulnerability, to feel unsupported, to have internalized a sense 
of aloneness in the world at an early age, it is clear that for Olive, this vulnerability was too 
much to bear.  Shame is the understandable end result of this unbearable exposure.  The shame 
Olive experienced as a result of her physical incapacity, her ongoing emotional turbulence and 
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her seeming inability to be recognized (due to her status as woman) within the full range of her 
potential, devastated Olive’s life.  The shame of her physical and emotional condition might also 
signal her own alexithymia of the colonial predicament—an inability to fully hold/access/bear 
active witness to the devastation enacted on native black South African individuals and 
communities during colonial times.  Regardless, it was a constant, nagging, and relentless 
emotional experience of shame that persisted despite significant periods of physical 
improvement.  
In all my physical agony the thought sometimes comes to me, as the only 
consolation, that after my death some use might be made of my body, knowing what it 
had been.  You will find it in my heart.  That long asthma may have affected my lungs, 
and has now, but that isn’t the root.  It has always been a funny thing to me why opium 
and iron and prussic acid have been the only things that ever, though in quite different 
ways, really touched my diseases, and it was only last night, reading the book you sent, 
that I know why.  They all three strengthen the heart’s muscles.  (Olive Schreiner to 
Havelock Ellis, lines 9-17) 
 
What is wrong with Olive’s “heart”? A modern day clinician might see her somatization, 
her tendency towards turbulent intimate relationships, her complex and diffuse sense of self, her 
proclivity towards self-harm as outlet for anger, her chronic feelings of emptiness and fear of 
abandonment by loved ones as a reflection of Borderline Personality Disorder (American 
Psychological Association, 2000) symptomatology.  It is a characterological issue, a modern-day 
clinician might argue, perhaps as a result of early trauma, disrupted attachments and unstable 
internal object relations.         
 The only life I would ever punish anyone by taking [written during World War I], is my 
 own; I have always since I was a little child…. Thought the punishment one would have 
 a right to inflict on those who had injured one too much was to go and stand before them 
 and stab or shoot oneself and say ‘my blood be upon you.’ (Cronwright-Schreiner, ed., p. 
 316) 
 
 I also see Schreiner’s symptom picture as reflecting a borderline intrapsychic 
organization.  And, to stop there, to name Olive’s diagnostic predicament, lets her ancestors off 
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the hook.  In other words, the collective impact of colonialism and the lead-up to British colonial 
rule, matters in considering Olive Schreiner’s somatic distress.  For the purposes of my project, I 
will explore these collective ancestral disavowals (including Olive’s) in dialogue with a modern 
day version of Olive:  Lucy, a character in J.M. Coetzee’s contemporary novel, Disgrace. 
Lucy 
She becomes his second salvation, the bride of his youth reborn.  Poor Lucy! Poor daughters!  
What a destiny, what a burden to bear! 
- J.M. Coetzee, Disgrace (p.86-7) 
He cannot expect help from Lucy.  Patiently, silently, Lucy must work her own way back from 
the darkness into light. 
-Disgrace (p.107) 
 If we are so influenced by our ancestors, their bodies, actions, hopes and disavowals, it 
follows that a narrative such as Disgrace would prove compelling for my exploration.  In this 
story we witness the ways in which Lucy’s father’s body misbehaves and abuses women, 
especially ‘colored’ women in South Africa.  The complex impact of his actions, his 
embodiment, is then traced on her own body, a body that rejects men as sexual partners.  But it is 
also a body that enacts the same identity markers that we as readers might imagine her ancestors 
(white European colonial settlers) would valorize.  Lucy is a farmer, a homesteader, with modest 
dreams to successfully maintain a piece of land in the African “bush.”  As a result of what she 
has made for herself, within the legacy of her colonial forefathers, her father, early on in the 
novel remarks, “Good! If this [life as a “sturdy young settler”] is what he leaves behind—this 
daughter, this woman—then he does not have to be ashamed”  (p.61 & 62).   
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 Shame is introduced much earlier in the novel, before we meet Lucy, the possible source 
of David Lurie’s salvation.  While deeply conflicted as to how white South Africans ought to 
remember “the implications of culpability and the consequences of violent colonization,” the 
novel follows Lurie’s various attempts to temper, indulge and allay his guilt (Horrell, 2002, 
p.25).  In the end, after a violent encounter (his daughter is gang raped by three black African 
men during this traumatic event) with the latent aggression of apartheid’s victims, Lurie, feeling 
“the after-effect of the invasion,” his “pleasure in living snuffed out,” decides to atone for his 
transgressions with Melanie (the ‘coloured’ woman he assaulted while a professor and she a 
student) and then subsequently works day in, day out, at a rural animal hospital, humanely 
putting down (and disposing of) unwanted/maltreated dogs (Coetzee, p. 107). 
 Lucy, of a younger generation, processes her rape differently.  The remainder of the 
novel is dedicated to this distinction and signals Coetzee’s hope, I believe, in the possibility of a 
brave(r), less disavowed accountability of white South Africans in the ongoing unfolding of 
reconciliation.  Lucy is also, and importantly, a woman, and this has great bearing on what she 
experienced during the homestead attack and how she comes to terms with the attack afterwards.  
In this, Lucy is both victim and victimizer, doer-and-done-to (Benjamin, J., 2004).  She is a 
woman, who, as a result of that gendered embodiment and what it socially and culturally means, 
is victimized, made to “pay with her body, through its violation, the debts of white 
colonists/settlers” (Horrell, 2002, p.30).  In the face of this violence however, Lucy, 
demonstrates a “harrowing, fledgling acceptance of the terms” laid out by her victimizers (p30).  
She “acknowledges her debts and, rejecting the safety of white hegemony, will attempt to pay 
the price” (p. 30).   
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 Her father, David Lurie, cannot comprehend his daughter’s silence, her refusal to go to 
the authorities.  He is outraged and shamed that he was unable to protect her.  He assumes the 
worst, that the crime was gang rape, although Lucy remains silent on this matter.  He pleads with 
her saying, “There is no shame in being the object of a crime.  You did not choose to be the 
object.  You are an innocent party”  (Coetzee, p. 111).  This sentiment reflects Lurie’s hope that 
he, like his fellow white South Africans, might be spared the haunting of his white colonial 
ancestors and his own complicity in the violence of apartheid.  In many ways, Lurie never does 
fully see, can never bear witness to the horrors he and his fellow white South Africans enacted.  
So, what is disavowed wrests on Lucy. 
 One gets used to things getting harder; one ceases to be surprised that what used to be as 
 hard as hard can be grows harder yet.  (Coetzee, p. 219) 
 After recovering from the rape, Lucy, now pregnant with a child belonging to one of her 
assailants, transfers her land to Petrus, the elder black man with whom she was previously 
sharing rights to the land, itself an extraordinarily new post-colonial arrangement.  In the end of 
the novel, Lucy becomes one of his wives, in exchange for his protection and his assurance that 
she be able to raise her child peaceably on what is now his land. The consequence of her father 
and his forefather’s actions is indelibly inscribed on her body.  At the end of the novel, Lurie 
remarks on this intergenerational transmission while also noting the way that his daughter, 
despite what she has abdicated, has also grown more solid in her willingness to bear witness to 
the complexity that is race relations in post-apartheid South Africa: 
So: once she was only a little tadpole in her mother’s body, and now here she is, 
solid in her existence, more solid than he has ever been.  With luck she will last a long 
time, long beyond him.  So it will go on, a line of existences in which his share, his gift, 
will grow I inexorably less and less, till it may as well be forgotten.  (Coetzee, p.217)       
 
Side by Side 
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 Earlier in this paper, I asked whether or not Lucy must pay for Olive’s expansive 
settler/colonialist views.  In other words, as I noticed traces of Olive in Lucy and vice versa, I 
became curious about the way that Olive’s disavowals of guilt and shame led to such a stark 
“corporeal negotiation” for Lucy in her post-apartheid moment (Horrell, 2008, p.29).  In this 
section, inspired primarily by the work of Jessica Benjamin (2004, 2009, 2010, 2012), I will 
explore the complex interplay between the two subjectivities and bodies of Lucy and Olive.  
More specifically, I ask, can a hypothetical dialogue between the bodies/subjectivities of Lucy 
and Olive constitute a third space (Benjamin, 1997)?  Reflecting the feminist and relational 
imperative to value subjectivity and mutuality, thus “destabilizing the active-passive dichotomy” 
which is so central to the dyadic formulations of analyst/analysand, masculine/feminine, 
settler/colonial subject (p.xvi).       
It was history speaking through them,” he offers at last.  “A history of wrong.  
Think of it that way, if it helps.  It may have seemed personal, but it wasn’t.  It came 
down from the ancestors. . . That doesn’t make it easier.  The shock simply doesn’t go 
away.  The shock of being hated I mean.  In the act.”  (Coetzee, p.156)   
 
 In the passage above, in which Lucy’s father attempts to soothe her after her rape, 
Coetzee is perhaps proposing that, the true impact of the legacies of white South African’s 
ancestors cannot simply be experienced in an abstract and collective identity-as-guilt-manner.  
Instead, via the body of Lucy, we as readers experience the ways in which the personal and 
somatic impact of the violence of colonialism is inscribed, painfully felt, and must be lived with.  
In activating the third space of dialogue between Lucy and Olive, I am struck by the fact that it is 
likely that the intensity with which Lucy is punished and inscribed is commensurate with the 
incapacity of Olive’s white colonial social sphere to hold her pain.  
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 I am reminded here of my reaction to Olive’s persistent and unrelenting accounts of her 
somatic distress in her personal correspondences.  I felt overwhelmed, perhaps, as Uehara et. al. 
(2001) so eloquently describe in their work with survivors of the Cambodian killing fields,  
 Provided with no summation, evaluation or other narrative niceties, the reader/listener 
 sense that these pains and sicknesses go on indeterminately, without containment or 
 boundary.  (p. 46) 
 
In the chaos narrative, Frank (1995) suggests, “troubles go all the way down  to the bottomless 
depths.  What can be told only begins to suggest all that is wrong (p.99). 
It is almost as if Olive’s unremitting somatic pain and unarticulated shame and outrage at 
the violence being enacted around her, bled over, past and through the generations and landed 
with Lucy.  Consequently, Lucy’s embodied pain more fully elaborates the fullness, the 
unspeakable “bottomless depths” of one aspect of what was “wrong” with Olive all along.   
Guilt, masked in complex and constantly diverse, malleable manner, forms a 
discursive threat through white colonial and postcolonial texts.  Masquerade, the 
necessary performance of guiltless, innocent, self-effacing and self-sacrificing white 
femininity is, I would like to suggest, an ‘obsession’ or ‘narcissistic insurance’ which 
remains implicit in the writing of white women:  women who, like Schreiner in colonial 
pre-apartheid southern Africa are compelled to ask, ‘What must I be and do—or rather, 
perhaps—what must my protagonist be and do, to live in South Africa at this time?’  
[This reflects] a thread of guilt woven into a tissue of concealment.  (Horrell, 2004, p. 
769) 
 
 Perhaps the “tissue of concealment” to which Horrell refers, is my notion of corporeal 
text—the somatic reading of colonial and postcolonial texts with the intention of splaying this 
protective boundary of colonial and postcolonial disavowal, forcing it open, to allow what is 
concealed to come forth.  In this corporeal textual attending what emerges is a set of themes 
common to the experience of Lucy and Olive:  both women demonstrate a willingness to 
withstand physical discomfort to remain connected to South African land (and the ensuing power 
that this position confers); both women experience very little consolation or sense of solace 
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within themselves or their social interactions beyond their deep connection to the South African 
landscape; both women are sexually non-normative (Lucy as a lesbian and Olive is deeply 
engaged with feminism and notions of sexual liberation for women); both women channel their 
own shame and guilt via attempts to disavow needs/desires and fear being a burden to others 
(they are both staunchly proud of their self-sufficiency) and both women consequently reveal 
very little of their emotional experience to others, for fear of exposing unforgivable or shameful 
parts of themselves.   
 Despite many similarities revealed explicitly and implicitly in the body of Lucy as 
intrapsychic crypt reflecting Olive’s disavowals, I also note a significant and stark difference—a 
contemporary adaptation.  Olive’s health issues were one way for her to, via somatic 
preoccupation, evade complicity in the intolerable violence occurring around her.  
Unconsciously splitting off and channeling unbearable traumatic experiences constitutes the 
alexithymia of her colonial predicament, leading to the necessity of transmission of these 
disavowed traumas from generation to generation.  While Olive’s somatic preoccupations 
constituted an unconscious but shameful withdrawal, they also perhaps signaled a rejection of a 
regime or occupation she did expressly oppose but greatly benefited from.  It might have been 
her best adaptation, her way of navigating how to exist as a white person in colonial South 
Africa, to perform a weakened self, a debased and ever-disempowered self. 
 Alternately, Lucy knows, on some level, that she cannot evade complicity via 
withdrawal.  Lucy’s determination to stay her course on her land (in spite of the tremendous 
physical and psychological cost), is depicted explicitly as indicative of a nearly aggressive 
throwback to colonial times—a violent assertion of her right as a white person to own land like 
an other African.  However, understood in dialectical tension, one can also understand Lucy’s 
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refusal to withdraw as an unwillingness to evade her own complicity in the legacies of the 
violence of apartheid and colonialism.  She will remain, and bear the brunt, endure the shame 
and the guilt, for her ancestors, in the hopes that her child will benefit from her intervention.   
Unbearable 
 Ultimately, my project is an attempt to articulate where to position oneself, as a clinician, 
in relationship to somatic distress.  How does a clinician bear witness to a potential client like 
Lucy without a willingness to feel and understand the un-met psychic needs of Olive?  And is it 
possible for a clinician to hold the complexity of Lucy’s psychic life without examining his/her 
own relationship to “the acceptance of loss, of failure to repair, of hurtfulness” [Jessica 
Benjamin’s “key to moving from complementarity into thirdness”]” (Benjamin, 2002, p.475)?  
While still confounded by somatic symptomology, as a clinician I defer to Benjamin’s assertion 
when it comes to the challenge of working with intergenerational trauma as expressed via the 
body: 
having already argued that we have to find some productive and positive way to 
own our destructive past, I am addressing the matter of how to break down the we-them.  
In contemporary psychoanalysis How refers less to technique than to the internal, 
subjective processes that the analyst undergoes when attempting, for instance, to bear the 
intolerable. . . It is only possible to simultaneously accept the truth in the other’s view 
while maintaining one’s own by entering the space of the third.  (Benjamin, 2002, p. 478-
479) 
 
 I came to psychoanalysis as a scholar, much like Benjamin, to “illuminate social 
contradictions and collectively experienced tendencies,” especially in regards to more fully 
understanding the pervasiveness of collective trauma that I experienced while living in South 
Africa (p. 473).  Relational and feminist theories and specifically those that address the 
intergenerational transmission of haunting/trauma offer to the tremendously complex and violent 
legacy of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa a respite from the rigidity of the limiting 
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dichotomies of victim/victimizer/doer-done-to.  By extension, the limiting clinical discourses 
regarding the etiology and treatment of somatic preoccupations might very well become more 
expansive when considering intergenerational transmission of trauma and the importance of 
mutual recognition.  With this in mind, clinicians must acknowledge the wish to deny what is 
unbearable and overwhelming and choose, and when possible, remember the damaging function 
of these disavowals.  Benjamin (2012) writes, "I am not sure whether it is possible to 
simultaneously acknowledge trauma and confront someone with the way in which their trauma 
has led them to hurt someone else (p.211). 
Limitations 
 Two of the most salient limitations of my project are: it is solely theoretical in nature and 
utilizes non-conventional case material.  The focus of my clinical findings and theoretical 
interest lies primarily in the practice and theorizing of psychoanalysis and psychodynamic 
psychotherapy.  As a result, my findings, while potentially clinically applicable and theoretically 
relevant, contain no specific behavioral or treatment plans per se.  In this sense, my "findings" 
cannot be easily implemented in clinical training or practice because of a lack of evidence-based 
empirical research supporting my observations. 
 Furthermore, in utilizing non-conventional case material, it is possible that I inevitably 
will alienate potential readers who are not skilled or interested in expanding clinically relevant 
inquiries to literary material.  This positioning might emphasize the disconnect between the 
psychoanalytic community (that regularly engages in cultural analysis) and the social work 




 For the purposes of this project I was limited to applying two theories to my case 
material.  These two theories, while useful, limit the potentiality of my analysis.  I address 
possible avenues for further theoretical research in a subsequent section. 
Finally, this project emphasizes the experiences of white South African women in 
colonial and post-apartheid contexts.  The specificity of my focus necessarily challenges the 
possibility of expanding my findings to other populations.  As I mentioned when introducing my 
case material, the choice to focus on the specific experiences of white South African women 
inevitably excludes the psychic experiences of the vast majority of South Africans.   
Benefits  
And the words still help 
Sort of, or it sometimes seems 
That way in the moment…… 
It’s hard 
To separate a body from 
The words it lets fall. 
And then the difference 
Between what’s written 
And what seems, outside 
Of writing, almost just to be. 
-Ariana Reines, Coeur De Lion 
 
The relevance of pairing relational theory (in particular) and literature allows for an 
engagement in the multiple aspects of self, some of which cannot speak directly, some of which 
we only understand in interacting with other’s self-states (Bromberg, 1996).  Similarly, a 
conversation between Lucy and Olive illuminates the unspoken and unsayable components of 
each woman’s experience.  In this sense, drawing out clinical implications requires stretching our 
common understandings of “clinical” applicability.  This project extends the evaluation of the 
implications of colonialism, trauma and violence, expressed in somatic symptomology, to 
literature, an often-overlooked realm of clinical inquiry.   
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Further, this relational pairing demonstrates the possible ways in which we as individuals 
are constituted by relationships, collective traumas and violence.  These resonances can manifest 
as “unexplainable” somatic distress, as dissociated behaviors, or as a feeling of ghostly haunting 
in one’s own psychic experience.  It is in relationship, in these multiple pairings (whether it be 
mother and child/Olive and Lucy/analyst and analysand), that unformulated or unconscious 
experience can take shape and come into coherence. Olive and Lucy offer this to each other.  
 My thesis is about integrating perspectives from the fields of psychological research, 
literature and literary criticism with psychoanalytic theorizing and ultimately the clinical 
encounter.  As a clinician and scholar, I find that the integration of these perspectives, especially 
from interdisciplinary sources, can provide helpful perspectives on clinical impasses common to 
trauma work and the challenge of work with the somatically preoccupied body/psyche of a 
client. 
Implications for Clinical Social Work Practice and Research 
 The limitations of my project as they relate to the theoretical structure, unconventional 
methodology and analysis of critical literary and psychoanalytic theory also simultaneously 
signal a benefit, a strength.  In order to achieve somatic listening, to demonstrate the importance 
of attending to somatic preoccupations and distress, I was compelled to shift away from the 
established avenues of contemporary clinical treatment and formulating.  It is my hope that the 
clinical implications of this non-conventional research might extend to additional research, 
theorizing and empirical study on the topic of intergenerational transmission of trauma.  
Furthermore, I intend to provoke clinicians to consider more critically the ways in which their 
own subjective relationship to their bodies impacts their capacity for adequate witnessing when 
working with body-oriented distress and trauma. 
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Ideas for future research 
Somatic Listening 
It is Cornell West’s ragged edge of necessity—the experience of hurt and betrayal, the 
 insanity of cultural stories contradicting physical experience—that empower the  
 destruction of an epistemology, a social system, or a psyche.  (Fleckenstein, 1999, p.290) 
  In a similarly positioned critically engaged interdisciplinary project, K.S. Fleckenstein 
(“Writing bodies: somatic mind in composition studies,” 1999), challenges her chosen 
disciplinary audience (Composition, Rhetoric and English Literature educators/academics) to 
incorporate the quality of what she terms the “somatic mind” into its engagement with students 
(p. 286).  Her proposition of somatic mind orientation is: “a fusing of materiality and discourse. . 
. a reclaiming of corporeality,” an insistence, much like relational theory, that “both organism 
and place can only be identified by their immanence within each other” (p. 286).  Additionally, 
somatic mind (being-in-a-material-place), that emphasizes immanence and dialectics, embraces 
the notion that “corporeal texts are the means by which we carry our bodies in our minds” (p. 
287).  To further elaborate, Fleckenstein goes on to explain that, somatic mind “validates the 
contradictory corporeal certainty of both the ugly details and the glorious experience of life 
without defining itself exclusively by either” (p.290).  Essentially somatic mind, in its embrace 
of the corporeality and intertextual meanings embedded in literature and writing, in truly 
allowing space for the dialectics of experience of beings, “somatic mind is paradoxically bound, 
unbound, and rebound in spiraling transactions among flesh, ecology and culture”  (p.291).   
 Fleckenstein proposes writing and living somatically.  Based on my research, I began to 
wonder what it would mean to listen somatically.  As clinicians, how might we listen with the 
somatic mind?  If, as Fleckenstein asserts, “we all live and write in the gaps. . . between body 
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and text” (p. 301  ).  If we do ourselves a disservice, “reduc[ing] ourselves to mouths without 
voices,” without attending to our shifting and corporeal identities (p.301).  If, like Rashkin 
argues, we are always responding to “invisible intertextual messages,” then how can we as 
clinicians hold these realities in mind, embodied (p. 301)?  How can we exist as somatic minds, 
somatic listeners, open to the corporeal experiences of ourselves in relation to others?  Must we, 
as Orbach manages to do, encounter the fire of the flame of a client’s trauma in moments of 
exquisite attunement, words left unspoken? The physical space of the clinical encounter denies 
the somatic mind, betrays somatic listening, when it is dominated by abstraction, by the 
clinician’s disembodied knowing.   
Intergenerational Transmission 
The source of turbulence is an ancestral world. 
-Maurice Apprey 
The impact of trauma is so often determined by what comes after the event itself. 
-S. Gerson 
 At a recent 2013 conference (“The wounds of history: Trans-Generational transmission 
of trauma”), Jill Salberg proposed a “transgenerational turn” in contemporary psychoanalytic 
theorizing and practice (2013).  The conference proceedings galvanized my initial interest in this 
thesis project.  Much like other contemporary analysts today (Louis Aron (1998), Muriel Dimen 
(2001), Sam Gerson (2013), Dori Laub (2005), and Maurice Apprey (2013)), I am compelled to 
research the process and implications of intergenerational transmission of trauma in the clinical 
encounter.  In varying capacities, the conference papers paralleled my own interest in examining 
the contours of trauma transmission as well as the possibility of witnessing and repairing the 
“unbidden emergence” of phantom legacies of trauma  (Gerson, S., 2013).   
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 To accomplish a reorientation around intergenerational transmission via what Maurice 
Apprey (2013) calls “transgenerational praxis,” conference participants widely argued for a 
model of mind that is relational and contextual.  In other words, the “transgenerational turn” is a 
call to revise psychoanalysis to include a model of mind that acknowledges that it is relational, 
that we as individuals are constituted by each other.  This signals a departure both from Freud’s 
model of mind as predominately intrapsycic in favor of an emphasis of interpersonal factors, 
specifically the impact of disrupted attachment across generations as a result of trauma 
transmission.  The texture of trauma, Salberg argues, encompasses dysregulated affect, 
disidentified experiences and dissociative attunement passed from generation to generation 
manifesting as “blocked mourning” and other unexplainable symptomology (2013). 
 In order to accomplish repair via the clinical dyad, the clinician, many conference 
participants argue compellingly, must be alive and embodied as an empathically attuned witness 
for a client haunted by disavowed affect and trauma experienced by his/her ancestors.  
Interestingly, throughout the conference, the body was rarely named as a site for these 
transmissions.  The notion of the body as crypt, as Abraham and Tortok (1994) so astutely 
named as the space of intrinsic ghostly holding, was remarkably absent.  And so, future relational 
engagements with trauma transmission will benefit from a dyadic engagement with disavowed 
trauma held in the body as this project proposes.  Still, the somatic implications of trauma 
transmission, especially in regards to the framework of alexithymia, were validated by theorizing 
about the importance of harnessing the transmitted legacies of our ancestors in order for 
individuals to heal.  Maurice Apprey (2013), in his unpublished conference paper argues this 
brilliantly when describing transgenerational praxis: 
The subject embodies the phantom that seeks to return, gives intentionality 
to the errand (Apprey describes an “errand” as a opportunity to fulfill an ancestral 
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mandate) and returns to oneself in the new public space of analysis.  This new 
space is a reconfiguration that fosters healing and acknowledges the source of the 
internal turbulence as ancestral (n.p.) 
 
 As a result of my encounter with the conference, I not only experienced camaraderie.  I 
also came to believe that important research, both empirical and theoretical, must continue in 
regards to intergenerational transmission of trauma, both in regards to mechanisms of 
transmission, but also in relationship to clinical means of assessing and bearing witness to this 
complex and often-elusive process.  This research and subsequent clinical applications will 
require engaged and embodied witnessing in order for ghostly resonances of disavowed trauma 
to be known, held and repaired within an individual recipient of unbearable trauma transmission.  
It is my hope that the ongoing theorizing of such luminaries as Maurice Apprey, Sam Gerson, 
Dori Laub, Jill Salberg, Melanie Suchet and others will be recognized and integrated into 







CHAPTER SEVEN  
Returning 
Hysteria 
 In 2001, Muriel Dimen, Adrienne Harris and other relational theorists set about to reflect 
on the evolving notion of Freud’s hysteria in the clinical realm.  The result of this reflection was 
the edited volume, Storms in her head: Freud and the construction of hysteria (New York: Other 
Press).  In the introduction, Dimen discusses the fact that the “patriarchal core” of Freud’s mode 
of domination in the clinical realm (especially as he related to hysteria) is reflected in his 
“enactment of the unilateral paternalistic authority of the physician” (p.6).  Hysteria was 
understood by Freud as an indicator of (at best) rudimentary skills in symbolization (of the 
hysteric female client) that made the “talking cure,” with its emphasis on transference issues, 
challenging (p.10).  This is one reason, for so long, Joyce McDougall argues (1989), 
psychoanalysts refused to allow individuals with psychosomatic illness and/or alexithymia to 
engage in analysis.  Freud himself related to his analytic work with hysterics as decoding the 
body.  In other words, the “body was icon and text to be read as if by some anatomical dictionary 
that psychoanalysis was producing” (Dimen & Harris, p. 10).   
 My particular intervention in this reworking of Freud’s notions of hysteria revolves 
around the question, posed by Maya Lang (2007) in her brilliant dissertation on depictions of 
hypochondria in literature,:  If a body somaticizes its grievances, how do questions pertaining to 
the crisis of one body relate to the collective social body?  Furthermore, can we as clinicians 
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tolerate this question within ourselves to the extent that we can hold, for a somatically distressed 
client, the complexity of their experience?   
 If the body is a relational construction, then perhaps its distress can also only be 
understood via relationship.  Is it possible that, on occasion, there is no single repressed trauma 
that causes an individual to demonstrate medically unexplainable symptoms?  Rather, if 
considered in a collective context, can one read the white female South African body as an 
almost inevitably traumatized and grief stricken body?  When considered in relationship to other 
somatically distressed bodies, what meaning emerges?  And where does the “blame” lie?  
Perhaps what is so compelling about somatic symptomology, as Lang asserts, is that it has a 
displacing quality and simultaneously demands interpretation and then refuses it.  Freud’s 
client’s hysterical bodies spoke “in place of language and insight” and yet, placed in a relational 
context, this hysteric’s body evades diagnostic certainty and speaks to both the personal and 
collective past in the present materiality of the body  (Lang, p.4). 
Title 
 In the introduction to her book, Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of ‘Sex’ 
(1993), Butler admits to a sense of thematic failure, much as I have experienced throughout this 
project when she concedes, “I began writing this book by trying to consider the materiality of the 
body, only to find that the thought of materiality invariably moved me into other domains”  
(p.ix).  She recalls the ways she tried to “discipline [herself] to stay on subject” but could not, to 
the point at which her colleagues would taunt her stating, “What about the materiality of the 
body Judy?” (p.ix).  Much like Butler, I too tried to stay with the materiality of the body, only to 
find myself, like many clinicians, moving away from the discomfort of somatic manifestations.  
Butler navigated this tension by returning and reminding herself of her subject, of the body and 
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similarly, I have done the same.  Over the course of writing this project, in my clinical work, I 
too have found myself trying to remember the body, mine and my client’s. This project has 
highlighted the ways in which staying with the body, even the shared third space of the collective 
body, requires a confrontation with so much disavowal.  It has begun to occur to me that it is a 
choice, a conscious strategy, to engage the materiality of one’s body in the service of 
transformative and reparative clinical work.   
 The title of this thesis project, “What happens when the body matters?: An exploration of 
corporeal textualities in the life and work of two white South African authors and its implications 
for clinical social work practice” is a signal of a direct engagement with Judith Butler’s 
theoretical work, in particular Bodies that matter.  Butler’s feminist and queer theorizing (greatly 
influenced by and engaged with psychoanalytic theories) on desire and gender, sexual identity 
and gender performance, violence and postcolonialism, and deeply complex questions 
concerning the complexity of bodies and identity, is likely one of the most influential since the 
late 80’s in western cultural criticism.   
 Butler’s theorizing is powerful and aims not only to deconstruct, but also in her 
questions, her challenging, she cultivates empowered frameworks for historically marginalized 
subjectivities to come more fully into being.  In referencing Butler in my title, I hoped to align 
myself with her mission.  Aside from elaborating a critical analysis of the role of the body in the 
intergenerational transmission of trauma, I am left wondering: where is the agency, the power, in 
my analysis?  How can I connect to the ways that regulated bodies (especially female gendered 
bodies) have power in my last analysis?  Given my project, I am wary of idealizing or 
symbolizing the gendered body, specifically the bodies of Lucy and Olive.  In the place of these 
seeming sleight of hand poststructuralist theories of body and embodiment, one encounters the 
108 
 
materiality of the body, and in this case, the white South African female body in distress.  It has 
not been my intention to wring hope out of a sick, hurting and demoralized body, nor has it been 
my intention to pathologize somatically preoccupied bodies as hypochondriacial, anxious and 
weak.  
 Lucy’s response to her role as a white woman with a body in postcolonial South Africa is 
a complex one.  In some ways she attempts, via her body, to complicate and reroute, much as 
does Butler, what agency in the new South Africa might mean in regards to reconciliation and 
transformation.  Lucy’s agency is located within her body and identity.  She understands this and 
thus, she engages in somatic performativity, opening up the complexity and capacity of a white 
female South African body to possess power: 
Performativity describes this relation of being implicated in that which one 
opposes, this turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power, to 
establish a kind of political contestation that is not a ‘pure’ opposition, a ‘transcendence’ 
of contemporary relations of power, but a difficult labor of forging a future from 
resources inevitably impure.  (Butler, 1993, p. 241, emphasis mine)  
 
Conclusion 
In Bodies that matter, Butler’s first description of the necessary reformulation of the 
materiality of bodies is:  “the recasting of the matter of bodies as the effect of a dynamic of 
power, such that the matter of bodies will be indissociable from regulatory norms that govern 
their materialization and the significance of those material effects” (Butler, 1993, p.2).  What she 
and I argue is that, in essence, a somatically preoccupied body in distress is not simply 
representative, but IS the effect of the regulatory norms that govern its materialization.  The 
colonial and postcolonial bodies of Olive and Lucy speak to the untenable, violent and troubled 
nature of the regulations of their contemporary South Africans.   
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 In this project I have allowed the bodies of Lucy and Olive to matter, to “emerge as 
critical matters of concern,” mostly to rescue them from the normative and regulatory powers 
that tend towards disavowal when it comes to somatic distress (Butler, 1993, p4.).  Sadly, as is 
evidenced in my professional clinical work as well as in my literature review, the pervasiveness 
of this disavowal implicates many practicing and training mental health professionals.  While 
useful and inspiring, many discourses within psychoanalysis also serve a regulatory function in 
terms of formulating somatic phenomena.    
 When a clinician fails to see/look for the coherence, the story as it is behind the somatic 
symptomatology or distress, it indicates to the client the level of the clinician’s own dissociation, 
his/her own reluctance to see and have to hold, embody, legacies of atrocity, the far reaching 
impact of collective horrors (e.g.: Apartheid, the Holocaust).  To demonstrate empathy then, to 
not disavow Lucy’s suffering after her rape, is to conjure up Olive.  Olive’s symptoms, at the 
very least, beyond psychic trauma, indicate a desire for recognition.  If somatic distress in white 
South African women remains a “wordless enactment,” without coherence, it is evident to me 
that history will repeat itself (Dimen, M. & Harris, A., 2001, p.9).  In other words, the repressed 
guilt and shame, the violent desires, all that makes up the white female unconscious in colonial 
and postcolonial moments, left unattended, might re-emerge in more covert and aggressive ways 
with the repressed collective trauma, the alexithymia of the colonial predicament, leading to 
ongoing relational violence.  The disavowed in all of us, left unacknowledged and unheard, will 
return.   
 It is in attending then, as Jessica Benjamin (2004) encourages, to the psychic wounds of 
the doer, the done-to and those parts in each of us, that can interrupt the ongoing violent 
resonances of the Holocaust or Apartheid.  Curiosity about somatic distress is one avenue for this 
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attending.  Relational and feminist theories assert that bodies/identities do not exist outside of a 
relational context.  Therefore, a distressed body can indicate, as Stephen Clingman wrote in his 
review of Alexandra Fuller’s memoir, the “madness” of the larger social context (2006).  The 
charge I pose to mental health professionals therefore, is to find ways to be willing to explore 
these aggressive and violent disavowals articulated in somatic distress, lest we witness and 
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